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FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND THE 
MARKET FOR LAW 
Erin O’Hara O’Connor* 
Susan D. Franck** 
In this Article, Professors O’Hara O’Connor and Franck adapt and 
extend Larry Ribstein’s positive framework for analyzing the role of juris-
dictional competition in the law market.  Specifically, the authors provide 
an institutional framework focused on interest group representation that 
can be used to balance the tensions underlying foreign investment law, in-
cluding the desire to compete to attract investments and countervailing 
preferences to retain domestic policymaking discretion.  The framework 
has implications for the respective roles of BITs and investment contracts 
as well as the inclusion and interpretation of various foreign investment 
provisions. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Larry Ribstein was blessed with an amazingly creative mind and 
with it he worked hard to develop a large number of generative ideas.  
Among his many intellectual strengths, Larry had a delightful ability to 
take another’s argument, turn it on its side, and deliver it back to the au-
thor with new possibilities for scholarship.  With Larry’s spirit of intellec-
tual generosity, we hope to do the same here, using his jurisdictional 
competition ideas.  In particular, we consider the extent to which Larry’s 
insights on jurisdictional competition can help to resolve controversies 
surrounding international investment law, through bilateral investment 
treaties (“BITs”) and investment contracts. 
Larry’s insights regarding jurisdictional competition were particular-
ly strong.  Building on prior work in the area, Larry wrote a series of ar-
ticles and a book highlighting the importance of choice of law for spark-
ing jurisdictional competition among governments for laws desired by 
private parties, in particular contracting parties.1  In essence, contracting 
parties utilize a number of means for maximizing their joint gains to 
transacting, including choosing the law and other rules that best serve 
their private interests. 2 
In The Law Market, Ribstein and O’Hara provided a framework for 
thinking about jurisdictional competition for governing law in which pri-
vate parties on the demand side shop for governing laws supplied by 
states.3  Those governing laws included rules for regulating and for oth-
erwise helping the parties to order their conduct and relationships.4  
Through courts, the states also acted as neutral arbiters in cases where 
the parties sought conflict resolution, and in these cases, the courts issued 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. See generally ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009); F. H. 
Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 561; Bruce H. 
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Limited Liabil-
ity Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91; Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Nevada and the 
Market for Corporate Law, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1165 (2012); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Rib-
stein, Uniformity, Choice of Law and Software Sales, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 261 (1999); Erin A. 
O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151 
(2000); Erin Ann O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Rules and Institutions in Developing a Law Market: 
Views from the United States and Europe, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2147 (2008); Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann 
O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661 [hereinafter Ribstein & 
O’Hara, Corporations]; Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 999 (1994) [hereinafter Ribstein, Delaware]; Larry E. Ribstein, E-Marriage and the 
Market for Marriage Law, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1111 (2011); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Law 
Firm Structure and Choice of Law, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1161 (2001); Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency 
to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363 (2003) [hereinafter Ribstein, From Effi-
ciency]; Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, State Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 51 EMORY 
L.J. 1 (2002). 
 2. See generally O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 66–73. 
 3. Id. at 66. 
 4. See generally id. at 65‒84. 
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choice-of-law decisions that could be influenced by the parties’ contract.  
For better or worse, jurisdictional competition can force states to become 
price takers in the market for law, with the result that many legal rules 
intended to be mandatory effectively become default rules.5  Put differ-
ently, the desire to attract or at least retain assets, jobs, talent, and tax 
base can cause states to allow parties to opt out of local law.  In the end, 
however, the states choose whether to enforce the parties’ choice of law. 
In The Law Market, Ribstein and O’Hara focused on describing the 
jurisdictional competition phenomenon in positive terms, and then de-
termining which governmental institutions within the United States were 
best situated to make decisions about whether private parties should be 
permitted to opt out of governing laws.  Specifically, in hard cases, the 
legal question typically pits competing interest groups against one anoth-
er, with exit-affected groups pushing for private choice, and some domes-
tic interests pushing for maximal retention of the influence of domestic 
laws and regulations.  The authors proposed a federal choice-of-law stat-
ute designed to help ensure that these competing interests would have 
maximal representation in the choice-of-law decision.  From this perspec-
tive, the choice-of-law decision is better housed in legislatures than in 
courts.  Legislative decisions also promote clearer rule making than cur-
rent judicial treatment of the enforcement of choice-of-law clauses, and 
that clarity would provide valued predictability for private parties.  Fur-
thermore, other sovereigns would be more likely to respect the wishes of 
a state with clear legislative determinations on the matter.  Finally, clear 
rules would enable the law market to function more efficiently.  To facili-
tate this institutional shift, O’Hara and Ribstein’s proposed federal stat-
ute provided that choice-of-law clauses were to be enforced unless the 
state legislature provided otherwise.  In addition to promoting the bene-
fits stated above, the proposed statute would place a thumb on the scale 
in favor of enforcement of choice-of-law clauses, which could serve to fa-
cilitate the law market. 
In this Article, we hope to extend the law market framework while 
adapting it to jurisdictional competition for international investment.  
Our aim is to find insights for the legal treatment of BITs and investor-
state contracts, a topic unexplored in The Law Market.  Because states 
actively seek to attract foreign investment through a variety of legal and 
economic incentives, the law market framework should provide an espe-
cially useful lens through which to view foreign investment law.  States 
clearly compete to provide legal mechanisms that are appealing to for-
eign investors—including through BITs and foreign investment contracts.  
But the effects on the law market go deeper than these instruments.  
BITs and investment contracts make it easier for commercial activities 
and assets to cross national borders, which means that those instruments 
enhance global asset mobility.  This mobility is key to the functioning of 
the law market more generally.  Put differently, enhanced foreign in-
                                                                                                                                      
 5. See id. at 15. 
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vestment increases jurisdictional competition pressures on the state to 
provide more appealing commercial laws across the board. 
Although we are not the first to identify this connection between ju-
risdictional competition and foreign investment law, we believe that we 
are the first to give the topic sustained attention.  Typically, authors view 
jurisdictional competition either as a normative good or bad.6  For the 
former group, international investment instruments presumably should 
be promoted and interpreted as broadly as possible to continue to foster 
this jurisdictional competition.7  For the latter group, international in-
vestment instruments presumably should be eliminated, scaled back, 
and/or interpreted as narrowly as possible to enable states to serve other 
important domestic interests.8 
In the spirit of The Law Market, we instead focus on how best to en-
sure that all interests, exit-affected and otherwise, can participate in state 
commitments regarding foreign investment.  As in The Law Market, we 
take this approach recognizing that jurisdictional competition for foreign 
investment is neither wholly good nor bad, as an objective matter.9  Alt-
hough many states work to attract foreign investment, it is reasonable to 
conclude that, in general, sovereigns strive to do this at the least possible 
cost to their sovereign authority.10  The questions regarding a state’s de-
mand for foreign investment and willingness to pay for that investment 
with constraints on governmental authority is a function of the balance of 
interests within each state, which will differ across states.  Thus, the best 
way for each state to determine its optimal tradeoff is to adopt mecha-
nisms that promote participation by affected interests. 
Foreign investment often implicates obligations that result from 
BITs negotiated by two nations’ governments.  In BITs, each state agrees 
                                                                                                                                      
 6. To put it otherwise, scholars take positions on whether jurisdictional competition leads to a 
race to the top or to the bottom. 
 7. For example, to support his conclusions that Most-Favored-Nation provisions should be in-
terpreted as broadly as possible, Schill argues, in part: 
The policies underlying investment treaties further justify the broadening of MFN treatment to 
include the host State's broader consent to investor-State dispute settlement.  Their object and 
purpose consist in promoting and protecting foreign investment, often with a particular focus on 
directing investment flows into developing countries.  A crucial factor to this objective is the pro-
tection of foreign investors by ensuring the stability and predictability of their investment activi-
ties and their investment-related rights.  Above all, the enforcement of BITs’ substantive obliga-
tions helps to transform mere statements of political intent into enforceable rights.  Giving 
foreign investors recourse to investor-State arbitration therefore adds to promoting foreign in-
vestment flows and achieving the purpose of investment treaties. 
Stephan W. Schill, Multilateralizing Investment Treaties Through Most-Favored Nation Clauses,  27 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 496, 554 (2009) (emphases added). 
 8. Cf. Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Environmental Protection and International Competi-
tiveness: A Conceptual Framework, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 7 (1998) (discussing how competition for 
foreign investments can hinder environmental protection); H. Jeffrey Leonard, Confronting Industrial 
Pollution in Rapidly Industrializing Countries: Myths, Pitfalls, and Opportunities, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
779 (1985) (same). 
 9. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 12 (conceding that it is very difficult to determine 
how much constraint on law market freedoms is appropriate). 
 10. We set aside here the possibility that some constraints are essentially political in nature, as 
when political conservatives tie the hands of the government to raise tax rates or regulate industry 
conduct.  This too could be a result of interest group competition. 
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to grant certain rights and protections to investors from the other state.11  
Commonly, BITs empower foreign investors to sue the host state for 
failure to abide by its promises.12  In addition, some foreign investment 
takes place only after a contract is formed between a host state and the 
foreign investor.13  In that investor/state contract, or “investment con-
tract,” the state agrees to provide certain protections to the investor, of-
ten in return for the investor taking on certain obligations regarding its 
conduct within the nation.14  The investment contract could simply in-
volve this exchange of obligations as a prerequisite either to the investor 
gaining permission to do business in the state or to the investor’s willing-
ness to make an investment, or both.15  The investment contract can also 
be concluded as part of a transaction where the investor receives a con-
cession or agrees to provide some good or service to the state. 16 
To a significant degree, the state’s dilemma here is similar to that 
presented in The Law Market.  States seeking to attract assets and other 
investments compete with one another to create legal environments that 
are desired by the investors.  One desired rule is a commitment not to 
impose costly regulations on the investor.  These commitments, however, 
can hamper efforts by domestic interests in the state to obtain laws that 
benefit them.  Consider, for example, domestic pressures to protect air or 
water quality, or to raise the minimum wage.  As a result, some domestic 
interest groups will pressure the government to provide laws that are less 
desirable to the mobile investors.  The degree to which a state is willing 
to compete in the law market will turn on the relative balance of power 
between these competing interest groups.  Treating the legal issues sur-
rounding foreign investment might therefore benefit from an institution-
al analysis akin to that used in The Law Market. 
The role of the state differs in the context of international invest-
ment, however, for several reasons, which will require a modification of 
the law market framework.  First, in The Law Market, O’Hara and  
Ribstein did not fully consider state efforts to constrain legal reforms as a 
                                                                                                                                      
 11. CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUB- 
STANTIVE PRINCIPLES 45 (2007). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Jason Webb Yackee, Toward a Minimalist System of International Investment Law?, 32 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 303, 321 (2009).  
 14. Id. at 322. 
 15. See Stephan W. Schill, Enabling Private Ordering: Function, Scope and Effect of Umbrella 
Clauses in International Investment Treaties, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 18–20 (2009) (providing example of 
construction and service contract as form of investment contract); Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote For-
eign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 811‒12 (2008) (using example of concession con-
tracts as common form of investment contract).  
 16. Michael D. Ramsey, Acts of State and Foreign Sovereign Obligations, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 
32 (1998); Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors Before 
Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1550, 1585 (2009) (describing a 
concession made by Libya in a contract with British Petroleum); see also Anthea Roberts, Clash of 
Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 63 
(2013) (discussing how investment contracts between private investors and public authorities can in-
volve “a concession contract for developing natural resources or the privatization of government ser-
vices like water and electricity”).  
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device for attracting the mobile.  In the international investment context, 
states often sign BITs with other states that can severely limit a state’s 
ability to respond to competing domestic interests.17  In addition, unlike 
in The Law Market context, BITs typically take legal questions out of the 
hands of state courts and place them into the hands of arbitral tribunals.  
Some choices of arbitration forum carry with them a choice to opt out of 
state law and into international law principles for purposes of determin-
ing the scope of the state’s BIT obligations; by placing the ultimate de-
termination in the hands of external arbitrators, the state loses its ability 
to fine-tune its legal incentives through interpretation of domestic laws. 
Second, The Law Market only considered situations where private 
parties entered contracts, but foreign investment often involves states as 
contracting parties.  The state’s contract provides it with an additional 
mechanism to make commitments in return for foreign investment.  In 
investment contracts, states often undertake different obligations than 
those undertaken in the BIT, for a variety of reasons, raising questions 
about how to accommodate potentially contradictory promises.  In par-
ticular, does the BIT, the contract, or some combination of the two best 
reflect the state’s judgment about how to resolve the tension between at-
tracting investment and retaining the sovereign authority to address oth-
er domestic interests? 
Third, the institutional design questions differ in the foreign invest-
ment context, at least in those circumstances where states commit to al-
low independent arbitrators to resolve their disputes with investors.  In 
the law market context, choice-of-law questions were determined either 
by courts or legislatures.  In the foreign investment context, the state’s 
statements about the governing rules are formed through legislative and 
executive decisions, with domestic courts playing little or no role.  From 
an institutional perspective, then, resolving tensions between investment 
contracts and BITs can require a comparative institutional analysis be-
tween the executive and the legislative branches of government.  But 
given that nation states differ significantly in their governmental struc-
tures, even this comparison will not work for all involved states. 
Although BITs have been very popular in the last thirty years, they 
have recently been heavily criticized.  Specifically, states, nongovernmen-
tal organizations (“NGOs”), and scholars have begun to question wheth-
er it makes sense for states to continue to sign BITs given their potential 
liabilities and the threat BITs pose to effective sovereign authority.18  A 
                                                                                                                                      
 17. Some BITs have sunset provisions that enable them to reverse course with respect to future 
investors, but only after a number of years, and other BITs have no sunset provisions at all.  See PAUL 
E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL RISK 109 (1997) (describing the sunset clause of a particular 
BIT); LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 104‒05 (2010).  
 18. See, e.g., PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA OLIVET, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW LAW 
FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM 12–18 
(2012), available at http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-from-injustice. 
pdf;, Gus Van Harten et al., Public Statement on the International Investment Regime ¶ 8 (Aug. 31, 
2010), available at http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement/documents/Public%20Statement% 
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few states have decided that the marginal contribution to investment 
does not justify the costs of treaty commitments; these states are either 
walking away from prior treaty commitments or at least refusing to con-
tinue to agree to potentially far-reaching concessions in future BITs.19  At 
the same time, and in part in light of the BITs controversy, a number of 
important issues have arisen in recent years regarding BIT interpretation 
and the interplay between BITs and investment contracts.  We believe 
that a modified law market framework carries the promise of reshaping 
the debate toward one of how best to accommodate competing interests.  
This more neutral approach could lead to a watering down of foreign in-
vestment instruments at the margin, but it could prevent states from 
walking away from BITs and international arbitration. 
We adapt the conceptual structure provided in The Law Market to 
help evaluate the claims of states, investors, arbitrators, scholars, and 
other active participants in the debate over the appropriate interpreta-
tion of foreign investment instruments.  Part II provides background in-
formation about the growth of BITs as well as the multiple mechanisms 
that states use to make commitments designed to attract foreign invest-
ment.  It also identifies some of the thorny interpretation questions that 
surround BITs and investment contracts.  Part III explores the role of 
BIT umbrella clauses and offers a way for states to use a combination of 
umbrella clauses, treaty reservations, and investment contract provisions 
to most effectively fine-tune investment incentives.  We also provide a 
preliminary discussion of the potential implications of our analysis for 
other BIT and contract provisions. 
II. THE RISE OF THE BIT AND ITS INTERPLAY WITH INVESTMENT 
CONTRACTS 
This Part provides a brief description of the rise of BITs over time 
in Section A and then situates BITs in the menu of state foreign invest-
ment commitment mechanisms in Section B.  Section C then explains 
some of the BIT interpretation issues that have arisen in investment arbi-
tration.  Underlying these interpretation issues is the basic controversy 
                                                                                                                                      
20(June%202011).pdf.  But see Incorrect Claims About Investor-State Dispute Settlement, EUR. 
COMM’N (Oct. 3, 2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/october/tradoc_151 
790.pdf (identifying the European Union’s views about several inaccuracies related to the debate 
about investment treaties).  See generally, THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION  
(Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (gathering sources related to the debate about the value of invest-
ment treaties); SUSAN D. FRANCK, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: MYTHS, REALITIES AND 
COSTS (forthcoming 2015) (same).  
 19. Russia, for example, has withdrawn from the Energy Charter Treaty; Ecuador has withdrawn 
from the ICSID Convention and is seeking to narrow the scope of its dispute resolution obligations.  
In slight contrast, Australia has decided to continue to pursue investment treaties but has rejected the 
use of arbitration as a method of dispute settlement given efficiency concerns and the net value of 
treaties as being “oversold.”  DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, AUSTL. GOV’T, GILLARD 
GOVERNMENT TRADE POLICY STATEMENT: TRADING OUR WAY TO MORE JOBS AND PROSPERITY 14 
(2011), available at http://www.acci.asn.au/getattachment/b9d3cfae-fc0c-4c2a-a3df-3f58228daf6d/ 
Gillard-Government-Trade-Policy-Statement.aspx; Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603, 650 (2013); see also infra note 27 and accompanying text.  
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over BITs and the question of whether BITs, on the whole and as inter-
preted, unduly hinder sovereign authority. 
A. The Rise of the BIT 
States turned to BITs after several failed attempts to use interna-
tional vehicles to create shared global understanding about the law of in-
ternational investment and the rights of foreign investors.  An attempt to 
form a multilateral agreement on international investment failed misera-
bly,20 as did efforts to get the United Nations to come to an understand-
ing about customary international law treatment of the meaning and con-
tent of expropriation.21  In addition, the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”) proved to be an unsatisfactory forum for clarifying and enforcing 
state obligations regarding foreign investor treatment for several reasons.  
To start, ICJ cases needed to be brought by the investor’s state, and the 
resulting diplomatic complications chilled prosecutions.22  Moreover, the 
ICJ rarely awards monetary damages; when it does, the ICJ awards the 
state—not the investor—damages, and collection can prove difficult.23  In 
a sense, then, law market pressures facilitated the rise of investor rights 
where traditional international law efforts arguably failed. 
By the late 1950s it seemed clear that in order to effectively protect 
foreign investment, investors would need their own enforcement rights.  
In many instances, national courts were a poor forum for resolving inves-
tor claims.  Often, investors did not trust the host state’s courts to render 
neutral decisions and/or doubted whether the host state’s courts had suf-
ficient expertise or resources to adjudicate complex transnational dis-
putes.  Meanwhile, the host states did not wish to cede their sovereign 
authority to another nation’s courts.24  Thus, investors needed to be able 
to bring their claims in neutral and expert nonstate forums.  In order to 
facilitate such dispute resolution, the World Bank formed the Interna-
                                                                                                                                      
 20. See Julie A. Maupin, MFN-Based Jurisdiction in Investor-State Arbitration: Is There Any 
Hope for a Consistent Approach?, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 157, 158–59 (2011); Sergio Puig, Emergence & 
Dynamism in International Organizations: ICSID, Investor-State Arbitration & International Invest-
ment Law, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 531, 578 n.209 (citing K. Tieleman, The Failure of the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) and the Absence of a Global Public Policy Network (1999), 
http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/Tieleman_MAI_GPP_Network.pdf); Jarrod Wong, Umbrella 
Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide 
Between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 135, 140 (2006).  
 21. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT § 1.20, at 25–26 (2009); Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties 
that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 678 
(1998); Matthew C. Porterfield, State Practice and the (Purported) Obligation Under Customary Inter-
national Law to Provide Compensation for Regulatory Expropriations, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 159, 171–72 (2011).  
 22. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1536–37 (2005). 
 23. FRANCK, supra note 18. 
 24. Cf. Alejandro M. Garro, The Contribution of the UNIDROIT Principles to the Advancement 
of International Commercial Arbitration, 9 TULANE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 93, 166 n.99 (1995) (noting 
similar problem regarding choice of law for foreign investment contracts). 
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tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”); its 
“primary purpose . . . is to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitra-
tion of international investment disputes.”25  States signed on to this fo-
rum for dispute resolution through a multilateral treaty formed by the 
World Bank and opened for signature in 1965.26  Although the Conven-
tion provides basic rules of the road for ICSID arbitration, it does not by 
itself obligate states to participate in ICSID arbitration.27  Instead, mem-
ber states can consent to be bound by ICSID arbitration in other docu-
ments, including BITs and investment contracts.28  Currently, 150 states 
are parties to the ICSID Convention,29 with Ecuador, Bolivia, and  
Venezuela acting as vocal dissenters.30  When states agree to ICSID arbi-
tration, international law principles are used to resolve the parties’ dis-
pute, and there is no designated place of arbitration.31  One consequence 
of this fact is that all ICSID member states have an obligation to help en-
force the arbitration award, and no member state is permitted to decide 
that the award somehow violates its domestic laws.32 
                                                                                                                                      
 25. About ICSID, int’l Ctr. for Settlement  of Inv. Disputes, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
Index.jsp (last visited July 12, 2014); see also Puig, supra note 20, at 550 (discussing the purpose of 
ICSID).  
 26. About ICSID, supra note 25.  
 27. Id. 
 28. For a discussion of the circumstances under which host nations are willing to agree to submit 
to ICSID arbitration in their BITs, see generally Todd Allee & Clint Peinhard, Delegating Differences: 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 INT’L STUD. 
QUART. 1 (2010). 
 29. List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (as of November 1, 2013), 
INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, (Nov. 1, 2013), https://academia.edu/5423493/ICSID_ 
3_LIST_OF_CNTRACTING_STATES_AND_OTHER_SIGNATORIES_OFTHE_CONVENTION 
(showing that although 158 states have signed the convention, only 150 have deposited their instru-
ments of ratification).  Of note, Canada, which avoided signing the ICSID Convention for over thirty 
years, ratified the Convention in November 2013.  Press Release, Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Dis-
putes, Canada Ratifies the ICSID Convention (Nov. 1, 2013), available at https://icsid.worldbank. 
org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=Announcements
Frame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement138. 
 30. Bolivia withdrew from the ICSID Convention in May 2007, and under the Convention, the 
withdrawal takes effect six months after such notice is provided.  Press Release, Int’l Ctr. for Settle-
ment of Inv. Disputes, Bolivia Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (May 16, 
2007), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage 
&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement3.   
Ecuador withdrew from the Convention in July 2012.  Press Release, Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. 
Disputes, Ecuador Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (July 9, 2009), https: 
//icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType
=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement20.  Venezuela 
withdrew from the Convention in January 2012, after Hugo Chavez made public statements denounc-
ing the Convention.  Chávez No Aceptara´ los Fallos de un Órgano Internacional contra sus Expropri-
aciones [Chávez Will Not Accept the Rulings of an International Body against his Expropriations], BBC 
MUNDO (Jan. 8, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/ultimas_noticias/2012/01/120108_ultnot_ven 
ezuela_chavez_petroleo_exxon_fp.shtml. 
 31. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, art. 54(1) Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524 [hereinafter ICSID Convention] (“Each Contract-
ing State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the 
pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a 
court in that State.”).  
 32. Id. at art. 54; see generally CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A 
COMMENTARY 1115–1120 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing how ICSID functions as a mechanism for the set-
tlement of investor-host State disputes).  
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Other arbitral venues are sometimes chosen in BITs and investment 
contracts, including the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, and ad hoc arbitration under the 
UNCITRAL rules.33  Arbitration awards rendered through any of these 
alternative means are likely enforceable under the New York Conven-
tion, which has over 145 signatories.34  New York Convention arbitration 
differs from ICSID arbitration in that there will be a place of arbitration, 
and the courts of that state have some, albeit limited, authority to vacate 
the arbitration award.35 
State negotiation of BITs started at about the same time as the for-
mation of the ICSID Convention, with the first BIT signed between 
Germany and Pakistan in 1959.36  BITs became increasingly common 
during the 1980s and 1990s as a mechanism for spurring growth in devel-
oping markets.37  By 1999, 1800 BITs were in force across the world.  By 
2010, that number had grown past 2600.38  The number of new BITs has 
slowed down in recent years, with a small number of states announcing 
an intention to back off the signing of new BITs.39  Nevertheless, states 
regularly negotiate a sizable number of BITs, and the current number of 
signed BITs worldwide exceeds 2800.40  The number of BIT disputes has 
also risen in recent years.  In 1990, only one investment treaty arbitration 
had been conducted.41  To date, more than 300 awards have been issued.42 
Alongside the growth of BITs, there has also been a massive in-
crease in foreign investment.  By 2012, the global total of foreign direct 
investment stock was estimated to be approximately $23 trillion,43 with 
                                                                                                                                      
 33. See Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 28, at 3–6 (identifying different types of dispute resolution 
options in treaties); Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitra-
tion, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 38–40 (2007) (discussing research about where claims have been brought); 
Yackee, supra note 15, at 808  (identifying different types of dispute resolution options in treaties). 
 34. Franck, supra note 22, at 1549 nn.109–10. 
 35. Id. at 1547–57 (comparing enforcement procedures).  
 36. Wong, supra note 20, at 147–48. 
 37. Compare Working Grp. II (Arbitration and Conciliation), Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. 
on its 53d Sess., Oct. 4–8, 2010, ¶ 85 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/712 (Oct. 20, 2010) (referring to “more than 
2,500 investment treaties in force” and citing to the UNCTAD dataset without acknowledging that 
signed treaties may be in force) with Marie-France Houde, Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Novel 
Features in Recent OECD Bilateral Investment Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
PERSPECTIVES 144 (2006) (suggesting only 1700 IIAs were in force) and Catherine M. Amirfar & 
Elyse M. Dreyer, Thirteen Years of NAFTAs Chapter 11: The Criticisms, The United States’s Respons-
es, and Lessons Learned, 20 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 39, 39 (2007) (indicating over 2000 IIAs are in effect).  
 38. See Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 833 
(2012). 
 39. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013: 
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT xix–xx, U.N. Sales No. 
E.13.II.D.5 (2013) [hereinafter UNCTAD, WIR 2013] (indicating that in the early 1990s around four 
IIAs were signed per week, whereas in the last three years, the average has dropped to one IIA per 
week). 
 40. FRANCK, supra note 18. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. (identifying that over 272 awards in 202 different cases were public by January 2012 and 
noting that, on average, about thirty awards are rendered every year). 
 43. See UNCTAD, WIR 2013, supra note at 39, at xv, 217; see also UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012: TOWARDS A NEW 
GENERATION OF INVESTMENT POLICIES 84–86, U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.D.3. (2012) [hereinafter 
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approximately seventy percent of that investment subject to the protec-
tions of BIT treaties.44  Although it is not clear whether the investment 
causes the BITs or vice versa,45 it is clear that foreign investment oppor-
tunities would be considered substantial by any government. 
BIT provisions vary, but all BITs contain rights that the signatory 
states each agree to provide to the other’s investors.  Most commonly, 
BITs ensure national treatment (legal treatment on a par with what the 
nation provides to domestic investors) and most-favored nation 
(“MFN”) treatment (investors from the counterparty will receive protec-
tions granted in BITs the host state forms with other nations).46  In addi-
tion, BITs typically provide the investors with rights to the state’s full 
protection and security of foreign interests, rights to compensation in the 
event of state expropriation, and an unfettered right to transfer assets 
and profits out of the country.47 
BITs also ordinarily empower investors to sue the signatory state 
for breaches of the BIT, and modern BITs tend to include a dispute reso-
lution provision which designates a forum for the resolution of investor-
state treaty disputes.  Common forums for dispute resolution include 
ICSID, the International Chamber of Commerce, and the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce.48  Some treaties provide for ad hoc arbitration 
(outside the auspices of arbitral institutions) using UNCITRAL arbitra-
tion rules.49  A few BITs require investors to bring their claims in domes-
tic courts.50  BIT treaty provisions are typically interpreted and enforced 
using international law principles, but choice-of-law problems can arise.  
In this context, the choice is typically one between international law and 
the domestic law of the host state. 51 
Over time, umbrella clauses also became common features of 
BITs.52  Where present, umbrella clauses serve to close gaps in BIT pro-
tections by separately stating that the state agrees to comply with its 
commitments.53  The language in umbrella clauses can vary, but often the 
                                                                                                                                      
UNCTAD, WIR 2012]; UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT 
REPORT 2011: NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT xii, 191, 
U.N. Sales No. E.11.II.D.2. (2011) [hereinafter UNCTAD, WIR 2011].  
 44. UNCTAD, WIR 2013, supra note 39, at 217; UNCTAD, WIR 2011, supra note 43, at 102–03, 
191. 
 45. See Zachary Elkins et al., Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties, 1960‒2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 281–82 (suggesting that BITs spur foreign direct investment, 
which in turn spurs the creation of more BITs). 
 46. Yuval Shany, Contract Claims vs. Treaty Claims: Mapping Conflicts Between ICSID Deci-
sions on Multisource Investment Claims, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 835, 837 (2005). 
 47. Id.  
 48. Franck, supra note 33, at 12. 
 49. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 50. Allee & Peinhard, supra note 28, at 1‒2; Yackee, supra note 15, at 811 n.5.  
 51. NEWCOMBE ET AL., supra note 21, at 75–120; Yas Banifatemi, The Law Applicable in In-
vestment Treaty Arbitration, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A 
GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 191, 201 (Katia Yannaca-Small ed. 2010); see generally HEGE ELISABETH 
KJOS, APPLICABLE LAW IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013).  
 52. Shany, supra note 46, at 837. 
 53. Id. 
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wording is vague and broad.  For example, the clause might provide that 
each state shall maintain the obligations it has incurred with respect to 
“the covered investments.”54  Another common phrasing is that each 
state agrees to keep its “commitments concerning the investment.”55  Ar-
bitral tribunals disagree over whether such umbrella clauses work to ele-
vate investor-state breach of contract claims to treaty violations resolva-
ble in the arbitral venues chosen in the applicable BIT.56  We return to 
this question in Part III. 
Scholars debate whether, to what extent, and under what circum-
stances, the BITs successfully increase foreign investments.57  Some claim 
that BITs substantially benefit host-state economies,58 but pessimists ar-
gue that so many BITs now exist that states receive little or no special 
benefit to signing them.59  Others argue that BITs are just one mechanism 
for encouraging foreign investment and that domestic law coupled with 
investment contracts and political risk insurance can provide as much 
benefit to the state as a BIT.60  A few scholars have begun to tease out 
the specific circumstances where BITs provide investment incentives.61  
Part of the difficulty in resolving this debate is a distinct lack of good da-
ta on foreign direct investment;62 in addition, BITs work together with 
other state commitment devices, so tracking increased investment due 
solely to the BIT is nearly impossible.63  Regardless of the actual margin-
al effect of signing BITs these days, the timing of BIT signing64 and com-
                                                                                                                                      
 54. See id. at 837 n.13 (citing Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,  
India-UK, Apr. 14, 1994, art. 3(3), 34 I.L.M. 935 (1995); Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Russ.-U.S., June 17, 1992, art. 2(2)(c), 31 I.L.M. 794 (1992)).  
 55. See Wong, supra note 20, at 162.  
 56. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 57. Compare Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 111 (2005) (conclud-
ing that BITs work to substantially increase FDI into signatory countries) with Jason Webb Yackee, 
Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Ev-
idence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397, 434 (2011) [hereinafter Yackee, Alternative Evidence], and Clint Pein-
hardt & Todd Allee, Failure to Deliver: The Investment Effects of US Preferential Economic Agree-
ments, 2012 WORLD ECONOMY 757 (finding that very few countries experience increased investment 
flows after signing preferential economic agreements, including BITs, with the US). 
 58. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 57, at 111‒12. 
 59. For example, Yackee argues that BITs are not meaningfully correlated with political risk 
measures, nor do insurers seem to take BITs into account when deciding insurance terms.  In addition, 
limited surveys of in-house counsel for large corporations suggest that companies do not view BITs as 
playing a major role in investment decisions.  Yackee, Alternative Evidence, supra note 57, at 414–26.  
Evidence that BITs have reached their saturation point can be found in the recent shift toward multi-
lateral investment treaties. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See, e.g., Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment 
Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment, 65 INT’L ORG. 401, 402 (2011) (finding that BITs in-
crease FDI only when the host state is not later challenged before ICSID); Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, When BITs Have Some Bite: The Political-Economic Environment for Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties, 6 REV. INT’L ORG. 1, 2 (2011) (reviewing conditions where BITs are linked with 
increased investment).  
 62. Yackee, Alternative Evidence, supra note 57, at 410–11. 
 63. Id. at 413. 
 64. Elkins et al., supra note 45, at 267. 
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mon treaty preamble language65 make clear that a primary motive for 
states in undertaking BIT commitments is to attract foreign investment.  
Indeed, some suggest that host countries seeking to attract foreign in-
vestment (rather than the capital export states) drives the decisions 
about whether and when to enter into BITs.66 
BITs enable foreigners to invest in a state without needing to specif-
ically negotiate with the host government for assurance of rights protec-
tions.67  Even where BITs do provide protections, however, some inves-
tors nevertheless negotiate investment agreements with the host state.68  
The investment contract can serve several purposes.  First, the contract 
might form because the investor is providing goods or services to or on 
behalf of the government, such as customs inspections or water services, 
and investment rights naturally become a subject of this negotiation.  
Second, an investor might need concession rights or special permission to 
operate within the host state, and those negotiations include the invest-
ment rights.  Third, an investor might wish to form an investment con-
tract in order to provide an additional vehicle for enforcement of its 
rights, or it might seek additional rights not provided in the BIT.69  Some-
times investment contracts can affect an investor’s ability to obtain cheap 
political risk insurance.70  Finally, investment contracts become a vehicle 
for the state to extract obligations and commitments from the investor, a 
                                                                                                                                      
 65. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Government 
of the United Mexican States for the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments, It.-Mex., Nov. 
24, 1999, available at http://www.economia.gb.mk/files/appris_en/appri_italia.eu.pdf (“[B]earing in 
mind that the promotion and the mutual protection of these investments require that favourable eco-
nomic and legal conditions be maintained . . . .”); Agreement Between the Government of the Repub-
lic of Armenia and the Government of the Lebanese Republic on the Promotion and Reciprocal Pro-
tection of Investments, Arm.-Leb., Sept. 16, 1998, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ 
Download/TreatyFile/139 (“Recognizing the need to promote and protect foreign investments with 
the aim to foster the economic prosperity of both States . . . .”); Agreement Between the Government 
of Barbados and the Government of the Republic of Venezuela for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments,  Barb.–Venez.,July 15 1994, available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/ 
venezuela_barbados.pdf (“Recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded to such 
investment will stimulate the flow of capital and technology and the economic development of the 
Contracting Parties . . . .”).  
 66. See Elkins et al., supra note 45, at 246 (noting that host countries tend to sign BITs in clus-
ters, whereas home country signings are more stable over time, and concluding from this pattern that 
the capital importers decide whether and when to sign BITs); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History 
of International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 177‒78 (2005) (sug-
gesting that developing countries turned to BITs largely because, in the 1980s, developed countries 
reduced their development aid and other lending to multilateral development banks, which necessitat-
ed seeking private foreign investment); but see Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 57, at 73–74 (suggesting 
that the initial success of BITs was driven largely by negotiation programs promulgated by European 
states).  
 67. Jason Webb Yackee, Do We Really Need BITs?: Toward A Return to Contract in Interna-
tional Investment Law, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 121, 131 (2008) [hereinafter 
Yackee, Toward A Return] (citing Thomas W. Wälde, The “Umbrella” Clause in Investment Arbitra-
tion: A Comment on Original Intentions and Recent Cases, 6 J. WORLD INVEST. & TRADE 183, 204‒06 
(2005)). 
 68. Id. at 133, 140. 
 69. Id. at 134 (using example of “stabilization clauses”). 
 70. Some home state insurance programs require an investment contract with the host state.  
Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 33 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 449 & n.165 (2008) [hereinafter Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties] (citing France 
as an example). 
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topic that is never the subject of the BIT. 71  If a state wishes to obtain 
these reciprocal obligations through means other than domestic law pro-
visions, the state might actively encourage investors to enter into invest-
ment contracts.  We now turn to a consideration of how BITs, investment 
contracts, and domestic law all work together as state commitment 
mechanisms. 
B. State Commitment Mechanisms: BITs, Investment Contracts, and 
Domestic Law 
BITs are just one of at least three vehicles available to the state to 
express a commitment to protect foreign investments.  As mentioned 
above, although BITs enable many investors to invest in a state without 
entering into a formal agreement with the host state, the parties do some-
times negotiate investment contracts.  No good data exists on how often 
such contracts form, but investment contracts are apparently common in 
the natural resources, public utilities, infrastructure, and manufacturing 
sectors.72  Therefore, it is not unusual for an investor’s dispute with a host 
state to involve both a contract and a treaty claim.  In addition, the do-
mestic laws of each nation are also relevant to a foreign investor’s activi-
ties within a host state.  Domestic law places compliance and other legal 
obligations on the investor.  Often, domestic law also provides benefits to 
investors, including investor protections and favorable rules for contract 
interpretation.73  Because the three mechanisms—BITs, investment con-
tracts, and domestic law—all influence an investor’s legal rights, some 
comparison of these alternative options is warranted. 
One might ask which vehicle is likely to provide the most extensive 
investor protections.  Consider first a comparison of BITs and invest-
ment contracts.  A state negotiating on behalf of its local investors might 
well have more bargaining leverage than would an individual investor 
negotiating with the host state because the home state represents multi-
ple investors.  Put differently, if investors can aggregate their influence 
through the state, then they can exercise greater market power which 
could result in the host state’s willingness to cede more of its sovereign 
authority.74  There are countervailing factors, however.  A state’s invest-
ment contract with a single investor is likely more private than a BIT, so 
it is less subject to public scrutiny.  A single investor may be able to curry 
                                                                                                                                      
 71. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Private Rights and Public International Law: Why Competition 
Among International Economic Law Tribunals Is Not Working, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 266 (2007) 
[hereinafter Bjorklund, Private Rights] (noting that BITs are asymmetric in that only the states, not the 
investors, undertake obligations). 
 72. Yackee, Toward a Return, supra note 67, at 133. 
 73. Generally applicable contract law can be helpful, as can provisions that constrain govern-
ment action.  In the United States, for example, the Takings, Due Process, and Dormant Commerce 
Clauses can all work to provide investor protections.  Some countries have embedded into their do-
mestic law a promise to arbitrate disputes with foreign investors.  Yackee, Credible Commitment, su-
pra note 15, at 811 n.5 (stating that approximately twenty developing countries have done this). 
 74. Yackee, Toward A Return, supra note 67, at 131–32. 
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special favor with the host state’s officials in order to receive benefits 
that the state would not grant to all foreign investors. 
Even when this special favor is not obtainable, states can have good 
reason to exercise restraint in the granting of BIT protections.  Recall 
that investor protections limit the sovereign’s authority to serve other 
constituent interests.  Given this cost to investor protections, a state 
might prefer to economize on those protections where possible to pre-
serve regulatory authority and minimize dispute resolution risks.  Be-
cause BITs and investment contracts work in tandem, a state might ra-
tionally choose to grant minimal baseline protections in the BIT, which 
apply to all investors from a given nation, and then grant additional 
rights in investment contracts as needed to induce particular investments.  
Consider, for example, the difference between mobile investors and 
those who seek to extract natural resources not readily available else-
where.75  The former investors might need more inducement than the lat-
ter.  A broad BIT grants more than is necessary to investors in immobile 
sectors, so the state might obtain these investments at lower cost by 
providing the immobile investments basic protections through the BIT, 
while providing the mobile investments additional protections through 
the contracts. 
A state might also reserve some investor rights for contracts in or-
der to obtain reciprocal obligations by the investor.  As mentioned earli-
er, BITs are asymmetric in that they impose obligations on the state 
without placing any obligations on the investor.76  From a public policy 
perspective, the state might prefer to grant some rights only in return for 
investor commitments.  Consider, for example, the common inclusion of 
stabilization clauses in investment contracts.77  These stabilization clauses 
protect the investor against regulatory changes, and they typically grant 
investors significantly more protection than the expropriation provisions 
found in BITs.78  By reserving these rights to contracts, the state can ex-
tract return promises on the part of the investor to comply with certain 
standards of conduct.  These contractual devices can also work a type of 
“price discrimination,” where investors who are willing to undertake ob-
ligations “pay” less, in terms of future risks, than those who do not un-
dertake the obligations.79 
                                                                                                                                      
 75. This distinction between mobile and extractive industries is also mentioned in Elkins et al., 
supra note 45, at 294.  They find that extractive economies are less likely to sign BITs than are other 
nations.  Id.  
 76. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 77. For a general discussion of stabilization clauses, their role in investment agreements, and the 
choice-of-law issues that arise in determining their scope, see Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Sta-
bilizing International Investment Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 215 (1996). 
 78. Yackee, Toward a Return, supra note 67, at 134. 
 79. Of course, the BIT is not a necessary vehicle for engaging in this price discrimination.  A 
state could work with investment contracts alone to provide the marginal incentive necessary to each 
investor.  Indeed, Brazil has announced just such a strategy with its decision not to enter any BITs.  
See generally Elizabeth Whitsitt & Damon Vis-Dunbar, Investment Arbitration in Brazil: Yes or No?, 
INV. TREATY NEWS (Nov. 30, 2008), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2008/11/300investment-arbitration-in-
  
1632 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2014 
This use of investment contracts to price discriminate may face 
pragmatic limitations, however.  BITs may have special advantages in 
that they are public devices that can most effectively signal to the outside 
world that a state is committed to the development of an investor-
friendly reputation.  Perhaps BIT signaling is more powerful than con-
tract signaling because breaches of a BIT are more public and more no-
table to the media than are breaches of individual contracts.  Where the 
BIT commitments are necessary to effectively signal the state’s pro-
investor commitment, then that state’s BITs might be drafted to provide 
maximal protections.  If so, then there may be little room for the host 
state to promise more in its contracts. 
Now consider domestic law.  In one sense, domestic laws act more 
like treaties than contracts: rights given to investors are general rights 
and therefore might prove ineffective at targeting any particular invest-
ment.  Some domestic laws apply to all investors, both local and foreign, 
regardless of national origin, which makes them even broader than BITs.  
But other domestic laws can be targeted to a particular industry, such as 
the petroleum industry, and can therefore fine-tune incentives on an in-
dustry level.  In many countries, however, laws are not designed to oper-
ate on a single firm—that would take an investment contract. 
Although both are more general vehicles for state commitments, 
BITs and domestic law may differ with regard to their durability and ef-
fectiveness.  Specifically, some scholars argue that domestic laws are 
more easily changed than treaty provisions because treaties are long-
lasting, and vested rights form around the protections promised at the 
point of investment.80  This lock-in effect can occur for domestic laws too, 
but treaty modifications can take the assent of two states whereas domes-
tic law reform requires only the affirmative decision of the host state. In 
addition, the enforcement of domestic laws can require the cooperation 
of the host state’s courts rather than neutral arbitrators,81 which can im-
pede their effectiveness.  Thus, overall, domestic law may be both less 
durable and less effectively enforced. 
Importantly for our purposes, these three sovereign commitment 
mechanisms—domestic law, treaty, and investment contract—work to-
gether and carry the potential of supplementing and even modifying one 
another.  Treaties and domestic laws can work at a more general level 
with contracts fine-tuning rights granted to individual investors on an as-
                                                                                                                                      
brazil-yes-or-no/ (noting that Brazil has chosen to induce investment through contract rather than 
BITs without a loss of foreign investments, but also that Brazil’s domestic export industries were un-
happy with the lack of BITs). 
 80. For a discussion of the potential lock-in effect of treaties, see for example Andrea K. 
Bjorklund, Mandatory Rules of Law and Investment Arbitration, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 175 (2007) 
[hereinafter Bjorklund, Mandatory Rules]. 
 81. This is not always the case, however.  Greece’s foreign investment law apparently includes a 
promise by the state to arbitrate its failure to comply with its commitments, and Libya, India, Greece, 
Pakistan, Morocco, Iran, and Mali have similar laws that apply to the petroleum sector.  Yackee, Con-
ceptual Difficulties, supra note 62, at 447 & n.153 (citing A.A. FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT 
GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 187 (1962)). 
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needed basis.  The BITs are particularly useful to investors because they 
tend to include commitments on the part of the state to have disputes re-
solved by nonstate third parties.  But the state can do the same for do-
mestic laws and investment contracts, through either domestic statutes or 
BIT umbrella clauses. 
When thinking conceptually about how to interpret each of these 
sources, it is useful to keep in mind the basic tradeoff that all states face 
in the market for investment law: each state wants to attract foreign in-
vestments at the lowest possible cost to its sovereign authority.  Put dif-
ferently, foreign investment is just one of several interests that pressure a 
state to take action, and the more a state binds itself, the less it is able to 
respond to other pressures.82  Given differences in economic and political 
environments across states, states vary significantly in the degree to 
which attracting foreign investment becomes a functional priority.  An 
active competitor state will face relatively little countervailing pressure.  
For a noncompetitor state, the countervailing pressures dominate.  For 
the passive competitors, probably the bulk of states, the marginal trade-
off is most important to state decision making. 
C. BIT Interpretation Questions 
BITs tend to contain vague language, which is not surprising.  After 
all, these instruments are negotiated between two nations that often oc-
cupy different positions to govern a potentially broad variety of invest-
ments over a long period of time.  Later BITs and subsequent amend-
ments might become more specific,83 but even then much essential BIT 
language remains unclear, sometimes even aspirational.  For example, 
states often agree to comply with principles of customary international 
law;84 they promise foreign investors “fair and equitable treatment;”85 
they condition foreign investor protections on the firm conducting “sub-
                                                                                                                                      
 82. Cf. Elkins et al., supra note 45, at 277‒82 (stating that BITs entail significant sovereignty 
costs for the home country).  Elkins et al. define sovereignty costs more broadly than we do here.  In 
addition to restraints on the state’s ability to regulate, they include the costs of negotiating treaties and 
the political costs of garnering domestic support for them.  Id.  
 83. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment 
Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 79‒83 (2013) (detailing evolution of BIT language toward more 
specific provisions designed to remove interpretive discretion from arbitral tribunals). 
 84. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of In-
vestment, U.S.-Rwanda, art. 5(1), Feb. 19, 2008, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 110-23 [hereinafter US/Rwanda 
BIT]; Agreement Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on 
Trade Relations, U.S.-Viet., ch. IV, art 3(1), July 13, 2000, STATE DEPT. NO. 02-9 [hereinafter 
US/Vietnam BIT].   
 85. See, e.g., US/Rwanda BIT, supra note 84, at art. 5(1); US/Vietnam BIT, supra note 84, at ch. 
IV, art. 3(1); Agreement Between the Czech Republic and Ireland For the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments, Czech-Ir., art. 2(2), June 28, 1996, 2079 WORLD I.P. ORG. 1-36088 [herein-
after Czech/Ireland BIT], available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp?file 
_id=249673; Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Morocco Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, U.S.-Morocco, art. II(3), July 22, 1985, 
S. EXEC. REP. 100-32. [hereinafter US/Morocco BIT];.  Agreement on the Encouragement and Recip-
rocal Protection of Investments, Belg.-Indon., Jan. 15, 1970, art. 1(1) [hereinafter Belgium/Indonesia 
BIT].    
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stantial business activity” in the home state;86 they agree not to take “un-
reasonable,”87 “arbitrary,”88 or “unjustifiable”89 measures; they promise to 
create “favorable conditions”90 or to “encourage such investments”91 for 
some matters; and they reserve the right to take actions necessary for 
“the maintenance of public order”92 or necessary to protect “health.”93 
Decision makers at the venue chosen in the BIT will give meaning 
to these vague provisions by judging, ex post, whether the state’s actions 
have complied with the stated standards.  Where there is room for inter-
pretation regarding the meaning of these provisions, one question is 
whether national law (of the host state) or international law principles 
apply to provide such meaning.  When the BIT chooses ICSID arbitra-
tion, then international law principles will govern the tribunal’s delibera-
tions, but when the BIT chooses other venues for dispute resolution, the 
applicable law can be less certain.  In any event, the choice of forum and 
the governing law can significantly affect the ultimate determination of 
the state’s obligations and its resulting liabilities. 
The ultimate enforceability of an arbitration award can also turn on 
the dispute resolution venue.  Where arbitration occurs outside of the 
ICSID Convention, the arbitration will have a seat, which is the desig-
nated place of arbitration.  When arbitration has a seat, arbitration 
awards are subject to vacatur under the laws of the place of the seat, and 
the arbitral decision is subject to the mandatory laws of the seat.94  Under 
the ICSID Convention, the arbitration has no seat, so the resulting award 
is not formally subject to such vacatur.95  Awards rendered under the 
ICSID Convention must be enforced by other nations who are members 
of the ICSID Convention.  Awards rendered outside the ICSID Conven-
tion likely fall under the New York Convention, which deals with en-
forcement of arbitration awards more generally.96  Awards rendered un-
der the New York Convention must be enforced (subject to limited 
exception) by other nations who are members of the New York Conven-
tion.  Cross-border enforcement of awards rendered in national courts 
are a good deal less certain than either of these forms of arbitration, be-
                                                                                                                                      
 86. See, e.g., US/Vietnam BIT, supra note 84, at ch. IV, art. 15(2); US/Morocco BIT, supra note 
85, at art. I(3)(a)–(b).  
 87. See, e.g., US/Vietnam BIT, supra note 84, ch. IV, art. 3(2); Czech/Ireland BIT, supra note 85, 
at art. 2(2).  
 88. See, e.g., US/Rwanda BIT, supra note 84, at art. 8(3)(c); US/Morocco BIT, supra note 85, at 
art. II(3).  
 89. US/Rwanda BIT, supra note 84, at art. 8(3)(c).  
 90. See, e.g., US/Vietnam BIT, supra note 84, Annex H, at 4.6; Czech/Ireland BIT, supra note 85, 
at art. 2(1).  
 91. Belgium/Indonesia BIT, supra note 85, at art. 2(1).  
 92. See, e.g., US/Morocco BIT, supra note 85, at art. IX(1).  
 93. US/Rwanda BIT, supra note 84, at art. 8(3)(c)(ii).  
 94. See Bjorklund, Mandatory Rules, supra note 80, at 186–87 (discussing the New York Conven-
tion). 
 95. Id. at 193. 
 96. See generally Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518 [hereinafter New York Convention].  
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cause to date no multilateral agreement imposes an obligation on nation-
al courts to enforce judgments rendered in other nation’s courts. 97 
Even though the dispute resolution provisions in a particular BIT 
typically are clear enough to determine the governing forum and law, the 
BIT can work in conjunction with other BITs and with investment con-
tracts to create significant uncertainty.  First, there is the question of 
whether the MFN provision in a BIT extends to the dispute resolution 
provisions of other BITs.98  Consider, for example, a purely hypothetical 
situation where the United States enters into a BIT with Greece which 
does not provide for ICSID arbitration,99 but Greece later enters into a 
BIT with Singapore that provides for ICSID arbitration.  Does the MFN 
clause in the U.S./Greece BIT work to give a U.S. investor the right to 
force Greece to ICSID arbitration, by virtue of the fact that Greece has 
promised Singaporean investors a right to use ICSID arbitration?  Schol-
ars actively debate this question,100 and arbitral tribunals have come to 
conflicting determinations.101 
Questions that surround the interplay between BITs and investment 
contracts are even thornier.102  BITs can provide one mechanism for re-
solving investment disputes in treaties, while an investment contract en-
tered into with a BIT-covered investor contains a different dispute reso-
lution provision.103  How should we think about the interplay of these 
provisions?  One possibility is to treat the two documents as addressing 
separate matters; thus, where the parties’ dispute involves the treaty, the 
treaty dispute resolution provision applies, and where the dispute in-
volves the contract, the contract provision applies.104  Although in theory 
                                                                                                                                      
 97. This judgment recognition obligation does sometimes exist on a regional level, however.  For 
example, each of the EU member nations must enforce judgments rendered in other EU member 
courts.  See generally Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12).    
 98. See Tony Cole, The Boundaries of Most Favored Nation Treatment in International Invest-
ment Law, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 537, 553‒59 (2012). 
 99. Most BITs signed prior to 1985 do not provide for investor-state arbitration.  Yackee, Alter-
native Evidence, supra note 57, at 409. 
 100. Scholars who think the MFN clauses should work to extend the dispute resolution clauses 
include: STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
193 (2009) [hereinafter Multilateralization]; Stephanie L. Parker, A BIT at a Time: The Proper Exten-
sion of the MFN Clause to Dispute Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 2 ARB. BRIEF 
30, 31 (2012).  Scholars who disagree include Zachary Douglas, The MFN Clause in Investment Arbi-
tration: Treaty Interpretation Off the Rails, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 97 (2011); Yackee, Conceptual 
Difficulties, supra note 70.  
 101. Parker, supra note 100, at 43, contains an extended discussion of tribunal treatments of this 
question.  A handful of states have begun to address the scope of the MFN provision directly in their 
BITs or separately through ex post exchanges of interpretive understandings.  See James Harrison, The 
International Law Commission and the Development of International Investment Law, 45 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 413, 428–29 (2013) (providing examples). 
 102. For a general discussion of many of the issues raised here, see Shany, supra note 46. 
 103. The contract could provide for arbitration, in a different forum than that provided in the 
BIT.  Alternatively, the BIT could call for arbitration while the contract provides for court resolution 
of contract disputes.  See Yackee, Toward a Return, supra note 67, at 138 (providing Chile as an exam-
ple of a country that refuses to provide rights to arbitration in its investment contracts). 
 104. This approach was taken in SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic 
of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 146–55 (Aug. 6, 2003) [hereinafter 
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this seems like a sensible allocation, in practice investor-state disputes 
often involve both types of disputes.  Should the treaty and contract pro-
visions be read to call for a bifurcation of claims for separate resolution 
by separate decision makers, using potentially different sources of law?105  
Some scholars and arbitration panels worry about the potential costs of 
bifurcation of claims, including (1) increased expense, and (2) potentially 
conflicting determinations and awards, which could undermine enforce-
ment efforts.106 
If claims are to be kept together, should they proceed according to 
the BIT or the contract dispute resolution provisions?  What happens, 
for example, if the BIT calls for ICSID arbitration with no obligation to 
first exhaust domestic remedies and the investment contract provides 
that disputes must be resolved in national courts? 107  If instead, for prob-
lems deriving from the same investment and same government conduct, 
the BIT calls for ICSID arbitration and the investment contract calls for 
non-ICSID arbitration, where is the seat of the arbitration, and what 
procedures must the arbitral tribunal use?  Or, more perplexingly, what 
is the legal regime for the consolidation of related claims and issue pre-
clusion, given the risk of inconsistent outcomes? 
Even if claims under treaties and investment contracts would not 
ordinarily be kept together, what if the relevant BIT contains an umbrel-
la clause?  If the state effectively promises in the BIT to comply with its 
contractual commitments, does the umbrella clause give the investment 
treaty tribunal jurisdiction to determine the breach of contract claims?  If 
it does provide jurisdiction, what governing law should the tribunal use 
to resolve the contract claims?  The BIT will typically either explicitly or 
implicitly call for the application of international law to treaty disputes, 
but the investment contract might call for the application of national law. 
For this Article, we take on the question of how to best treat the in-
terplay of the BIT with the investment contract.  We do not resolve all of 
the interpretation questions that have arisen in this context.  But we do 
offer an approach to interpretation that encourages states to compete ef-
fectively in the market for investment law while still enabling them to 
serve countervailing domestic interests where needed.  As we explain in-
                                                                                                                                      
SGS v. Pakistan]; Compañía de Aquas del Aconquija, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 96 (ad hoc comm. July 3, 2002).  
 105. This was the ICSID tribunal’s resolution in SGS v. Pakistan, supra note 104.  The Pakistan-
Swiss BIT called for ICSID arbitration and included an umbrella clause, but the contract between 
SGS, a Swiss company, and Pakistan called for disputes to be arbitrated exclusively in Pakistan under 
the Pakistan Arbitration Law.  Id.  The tribunal took jurisdiction over SGS’s treaty claims but not its 
contract claims.  Id. 
 106. See, e.g., Bjorklund, Private Rights, supra note 71, at 256–61 (discussing problems associated 
with duplicative and fragmented proceedings); Shany, supra note 41, at 838 (discussing problems of 
inconvenience, expense, and inconsistent decisions).    
 107. See Shany, supra note 41, at 837 (noting this complication).  In SGS v. Phillipine, an ICSID 
tribunal acknowledged that it could take jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim as a treaty viola-
tion but decided to stay its proceedings until the Philippines courts could determine the contract claim 
because the concession contract stated that contract claims were to be resolved in Philippine courts.  
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶169–176 (Jan. 29, 2004) [hereinafter SGS v. Philippines].  
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fra, one important mechanism for doing this is to offer an approach that 
enables states to carefully calibrate investment incentives.  Our analysis 
begins with Larry Ribstein’s jurisdictional competition framework. 
III. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
In this Part, we draw upon and extend the law market framework to 
analyze jurisdictional competition for foreign investments.  Our goal is to 
encourage different thinking about the overlapping roles of BITs, in-
vestment agreements, and domestic investment law, with a particular fo-
cus on the first two.  We offer a functional analysis of the rules of foreign 
investment, in particular eschewing formal legal doctrines often applied 
to this area of law.  For example, we view BITs and investment contracts 
as two forms of a state’s expression of its commitment to investors.  In 
regard to the state’s relationship with investors, the treaty need not al-
ways operate as a form of super-law that trumps other forms of invest-
ment law, regardless of the language used in the BIT and the contract.  
Similarly, for purposes of this Article, we avoid formal law categories 
such as “third-party beneficiaries”108 and “‘derivative rights’ models,”109 
which can have the effect of choosing among legal documents for reasons 
unrelated to the role that the documents serve for states and investors.  
As part of our functional analysis, we consider how best to house and in-
terpret state commitments, given the state’s goal to compete for foreign 
investments while economizing on sovereignty costs.  By way of conclu-
sion, our analysis indicates that for many countries and investors, the 
best result often will be to elevate an investment contract, where one ex-
ists, over the applicable BIT, and we propose at least one mechanism to 
make that possible. 
Section A briefly describes the basic jurisdictional competition 
framework presented in The Law Market, as well as other works by Lar-
ry Ribstein.  Section B extends this law market analysis to the context of 
foreign investment, where states act as both law providers and parties to 
investment agreements.  Section C uses the analysis developed in Section 
B to draw implications for some of the current issues surrounding BIT 
drafting and investment treaty arbitration. 
A. The Law Market 
In The Law Market, 110 O’Hara and Ribstein developed a stylized 
conceptual framework to illustrate the incentives that confront states in a 
world where people and assets are mobile.  A market metaphor high-
lighted the fact that no single state can exercise monopoly power over 
                                                                                                                                      
 108. See, e.g., Bjorklund, Mandatory Rules, supra note 80, at 189 (using the third-party beneficiary 
characterization and then claiming that the investors therefore cannot abrogate the rights conferred on 
them in BITs). 
 109. Bjorklund, Private Rights, supra note 71, at 264 (discussing derivative rights model as com-
petitor to third-party beneficiary model). 
 110. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 10. 
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the provision of legal rules for private parties who can remove them-
selves—by agreement or otherwise—from its reach.  Within this law 
market framework, states act as suppliers of legal rules, and private par-
ties are the consumers who demand desirable legal rules to facilitate 
their private transactions.  Private parties can almost always avoid par-
ticular laws by removing themselves, their assets, and their activities from 
that state.  In addition to avoiding unfavorable laws, parties can seek out 
favored legal regimes by locating themselves, their assets, and/or their 
activities in a location with preferred law.111  In fact, for many legal ques-
tions, parties can ensure that their choice is respected by inserting choice-
of-law clauses into their contracts.  Choice-of-law clauses are routinely 
enforced in U.S. courts,112 and, in some cases, the clause is enforced even 
when the parties have no physical connection to the jurisdiction cho-
sen.113  When parties can reach out to other jurisdictions to choose their 
governing law, the law market is better facilitated and party control, legal 
clarity, and expectation management is maximized.114 
Parties demand governing laws for many purposes. The law serves 
as a standard form to fill in the inevitable gaps, where the contract lan-
guage is silent or ambiguous.  A strong set of default rules helps the par-
ties to economize on the costs of drafting their agreements.115  In addi-
tion, the parties seek a set of mandatory rules, including applicable 
regulations, that work well for them, given their structures and the na-
ture of their activities.116  Parties choosing law do so at the point in time 
when they enter into a contract, but their choice is one for the future, to 
govern future disputes according to the law that may be in place at that 
time.  Sometimes parties seek the application of one or more particular 
legal rules that they think is necessary to fully protect their commercial 
interests.  If parties cannot fully foresee the nature of future disputes, 
however, then they might seek favorable general (rather than specific) 
rules.  If they cannot know the precise content of the law that might be in 
                                                                                                                                      
 111. This insight is drawn from Charles Tiebout.  See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theo-
ry of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (presenting models where people reveal 
their preferences for locally-provided public goods by choosing where to live). 
 112. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 82–84; Ribstein, From Efficiency, supra note 1, at 
369–385. 
 113. In general, contracting parties in the U.S. must choose a law that is connected to the parties 
and/or the transaction.  See U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (2001) (parties can choose any law that bears a reasona-
ble relation to the transaction); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971) (for 
mandatory rules, a prerequisite to enforcement of a choice-of-law clause is that there be a “substantial 
relationship to the parties or the transaction,” or that there be another “reasonable basis for the par-
ties’ choice”).  Under the Second Restatement provision, however, a court can enforce a choice-of-law 
clause where it finds that there is another reasonable basis for the choice besides the parties’ connec-
tion to the state.  Id.  Moreover, six states have enacted statutes directing forum courts to enforce 
choice-of-law clauses in high-value commercial contracts without regard to whether the chosen law 
bears any relation to the parties and their transaction.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West 2014); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708 (West 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 685.101 (West 2014); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 105/5-5 (West 2014); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 2014); TEX. BUS. & COM. 
CODE ANN. §§ 35-51–35-52 (West 2014). 
 114. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 28–29. 
 115. Id. at 31. 
 116. See Ribstein & O’Hara, Corporations, supra note 1, at 669. 
  
No. 5] FOREIGN INVESTMENTS & THE MARKET FOR LAW 1639 
effect or applied at the time of the dispute, then they might seek some-
thing even more general—a state with a pro-business general legal envi-
ronment.  In this sense, parties not only seek desirable present law; they 
also seek to attach themselves to a state that appears to be committed to 
protect their interests in the future.117 
In addition to contributing to predictability and better fit, party 
choice can sometimes enable private parties to conduct business in mul-
tiple jurisdictions according to a single law.118  When this is possible, firm 
policies, which inevitably track the governing legal rules, can be uniform, 
or at least simplified.119  Substantive law is typically chosen with a choice-
of-law clause.  Procedural law, which influences the parties’ obligations 
as well as the costs of settling disputes, can be chosen with choice-of-
court and arbitration clauses.  Moreover, parties can select a forum that 
will respect their choice of governing law. 120 
If private parties are mobile, and if the assets that they bring to the 
state are sufficiently valuable, then the states might be willing to compete 
to provide a desirable legal environment for them.  By providing favora-
ble contract, property, and regulatory law, among others, the state can 
facilitate local investment and other commercial activities.  States can 
provide such an environment in multiple ways, including through sub-
stantive domestic law reform.  Delaware provides a strong example with-
in the United States,121 and Singapore,122 Switzerland,123 Bermuda,124 and 
Vanuatu125 provide examples from outside the United States. 
Alternatively, the state can retain its domestic laws but allow at 
least mobile private parties to opt out of those laws through choice-of-
law clauses.  The state’s decision as to whether to actively compete in a 
law market and/or to consent to parties opting into the law of other ju-
risdictions will turn on the interest group balance within the state.  Put 
differently, the private parties themselves will need effective representa-
                                                                                                                                      
 117. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 111 (noting that success of Delaware corporate 
law is due in part to the fact that Delaware’s franchise fees commit the state to providing high-quality 
corporate law in the future). 
 118. Id. at 26. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 73.  The most common way to do this is to specify that disputes will be resolved in the 
courts of the state whose law is chosen.  Id. 
 121. Larry Ribstein’s work was significant in showing this.  See generally supra note 1. 
 122. See Christopher M. Bruner, Market-Dominant Small Jurisdictions in a Globalizing Financial 
World 38‒48 (Washington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2013-19, 2013), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343111 (documenting Singapore’s position as a world leader in 
wealth management).  
 123. See id. at 48‒57 (documenting Switzerland’s ability to attract banking business through its 
bank secrecy laws). 
 124. See id. at 27‒37 (documenting Bermuda’s dominance in the reinsurance industry). 
 125. While best known for its beaches and as the location for the filming of the television show 
Survivor, Vanuatu is also well known for its bank secrecy laws and lenient financial services regula-
tions.  See Barbara T. Kaplan & Patrick T. O’Brien, Secrecy Associated with Offshore Banking is 
Evaporating, 119 BANKING L.J. 736, 740 (2002); Anthony D. Todero, Note,  The Stop Tax Haven 
Abuse Act: A Unilateral Solution to a Multilateral Problem, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 241, 267 (2010); but see 
Adam H. Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923, 957 (2010) (sug-
gesting that states like Switzerland and Belize may be even more attractive than Vanuatu for bank 
secrecy). 
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tion with government lawmakers in order for the state to respond to law 
market pressures.  Although traditional public choice theory posits that 
outsiders will lack effective voice within a legislature, in reality the desire 
to attract, or at least retain, the benefits of their local activities can en-
sure that outside (or at least potentially outside) interests are weighed.126  
These interests can be fueled by “exit-affected” interest groups, or do-
mestic interests that benefit from attracting outsiders. 
Ribstein’s scholarship emphasized the important potential role of 
lawyers in facilitating law reform.127  Lawyers are, of course, experts in 
the law; they have a comparative advantage both in organizing to exert 
political pressures and in drafting legislation, and, they have their own 
interest in ensuring that local law is appealing to the mobile.128  Lawyer 
licensing rules ensure that a lawyer has a connection with the state where 
the lawyer is licensed to practice, and licensing requirements often ena-
ble the exclusion of outside lawyers from local legal business.129  Laws 
that are desirable to mobile parties have the effect of attracting legal 
business to the state, to the benefit of locally-licensed lawyers.  Through 
this mechanism, additional pressures can be placed on the state to cater 
to the mobile. 
Nevertheless, these exit-affected interests must compete with the in-
terests of others, including negatively-affected third parties, regulatory 
authorities, and parties poorly represented in the contractual setting.  
The relative influence of both the mobile and competing interests will 
vary across the states.130  As a result, state sensitivity to law market pres-
sures also will vary. 
This variation deserves more focus.  In the law market, some states 
are active competitors, some are passive competitors, and some are non-
competitors.  Active competitors have a priority to pursue domestic law 
reforms designed to attract people, businesses, and/or assets to the state.  
For example, Delaware actively pursues corporate law reforms, and it 
has been a leader in both usury law and trust law reforms.  Florida has 
put in place a variety of laws, including tax laws, designed to attract retir-
ees to the state.  Outside of the United States, several nations are known 
as popular places to register commercial ships, based in part on their lax 
regulation of the ship’s activities.  These “flag of convenience” states in-
clude Panama, Antigua, the Bahamas, Liberia, Malta, and the Marshall 
Islands.131  Some nations adopt laws designed to make it possible for 
wealthy individuals to protect their assets from creditors and govern-
ments.  Such nations include Nevis, the Channel Islands, Cook Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Belize, Bahamas, Switzerland, and Liechten-
                                                                                                                                      
 126. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 127. See, e.g., Ribstein, Delaware, supra note 1; Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A 
Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 MO. L. REV. 299 (2004). 
 128. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 74‒75. 
 129. Id. at 75. 
 130. Id. at 80–81. 
 131. For statistics on foreign registries, see generally List of Flags of Convenience, WIKIPEDIA 
(Jan. 4, 2014, 9:24 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_flags_of_convenience. 
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stein.132  Some nations, like France and Singapore, have taken strong 
measures to ensure that the nation is a desirable venue for international 
commercial arbitration.133  These are just a few examples. 
Many states are not primarily motivated to attract others to the 
state, but they are nevertheless motivated to avoid the loss of valuable 
jobs, tax revenues, and other assets.  These states, which we can call 
“passive competitors,” are willing to take defensive measures when nec-
essary to preserve local opportunities.  Such measures might include 
adopting competitive law reforms tried in other states.  For example, 
some U.S. states reluctantly relaxed their usury laws after Delaware and 
South Dakota repealed theirs in an effort to keep banks from relocating 
elsewhere.134  Alternatively, some states will retain their domestic sub-
stantive laws but agree to enforce choice-of-law clauses, even where they 
have the effect of enabling some parties to circumvent local law.135  The 
U.S. Supreme Court articulated the position of the passive competitor in 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company when it made the following oft-
quoted statement: “we cannot have trade and commerce in world mar-
kets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our 
laws, and resolved in our courts.”136  Moreover, in some instances, includ-
ing arbitration law137 and tax rules,138 states adopt separate rules for do-
mestic and international activities in an effort to attract outside opportu-
nities without eroding the influence of domestic law. 
Finally, a third group of states will refuse to respond to law market 
pressures.  In these states, lawmakers decide that other values and inter-
ests take precedence over those reflected in competitive law reforms.  
Often, these states have large markets and/or other desirable attributes 
that will prevent mass exodus by business interests, at least with regard 
to particular legal matters. 
It is important to keep in mind that a state can be an active competi-
tor in some areas, a passive competitor in others, and a noncompetitor in 
still others.  Put differently, the balance of competing interest group 
pressures within a state often will cause the state to vary in its sensitivity 
to law market pressures across economic, social, and political contexts. 
In The Law Market, Ribstein and O’Hara proposed that U.S. law be 
altered so that courts must enforce choice-of-law clauses unless the state 
                                                                                                                                      
 132. See Asset-Protection Trust, WIKIPEDIA (Apr. 8, 2014, 4:07 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Asset-protection_trust.  
 133. See Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration, the Law Market, and the Law 
of Lawyering, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 87 (2014).  
 134. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 48. 
 135. Id. 
 136. 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972). 
 137. Christopher R. Drahozal, The New York Convention and the American Federal System, 2012 
J. DISP. RESOL. 101, 101 (2012) (identifying states like California, Texas, and Florida that have enacted 
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 138. See generally Kim Brooks, Tax Sparing: A Needed Incentive for Foreign Investment in Low-
Income Countries or an Unnecessary Revenue Sacrifice?, 34 QUEEN’S L.J. 505 (2009) (providing exam-
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legislature deems enforcement inappropriate.139  Ultimately, the proposal 
shifts questions regarding the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses 
from the courts to the legislature.  Shifting to ex ante legislative determi-
nations would provide more clarity and, therefore, more effective guid-
ance to private parties.140  This improved clarity would provide outsiders 
with better ability to respond to the legal rule, and it would therefore 
force the state to internalize the costs of refusing to enforce choice-of-law 
clauses.141  At the same time, competing interest group pressures would 
be more effectively felt in the legislature than in the courts.142  Thus, both 
the costs and the benefits of enhancing party choice would have a maxi-
mal chance of effectively being taken into account. 
B. The Market for Foreign Investment Law 
1. Supplying Foreign Investment Protections 
Foreign investment naturally fits into a jurisdictional competition 
framework.  After all, as indicated earlier, many states entering BITs are 
primarily motivated to attract foreign investments, or at least to not lose 
investment opportunities to other countries that have signed such agree-
ments.143  BITs are a critical part of the jurisdictional competition for for-
eign investments, but other legal tools provide desired legal rules to in-
vestors, including domestic law and investment contracts negotiated with 
individual investors.  The differing legal tools for attracting foreign in-
vestment have different features.  BITs provide rights to investors from a 
single nation without necessarily providing those same rights to either 
domestic investors or investors from other nations.144  Domestic laws typ-
ically extend rights to all investors, domestic as well as foreign.  In con-
trast, an investment contract provides rights to a single investor only.  
These legal mechanisms work together in the law market.  Given the ag-
gregate impact, it makes more sense to analyze BITs as just one tool, al-
beit an important one, in the marketplace for law. 
In the context of the law of foreign investment, choice of law oper-
ates somewhat differently.  In The Law Market, the role of the state is 
                                                                                                                                      
 139. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 199–215.  An example of such a statement would have 
been the now-abandoned choice-of-law rules in the U.C.C. § 1-301 (2001), replaced with Uniform 
Commercial Code, revised § 1-301 (2008), which as proposed followed the European approach of not 
allowing a choice-of-law clause to work to deprive consumers of legal protections available in their 
home states.  Regulation 594/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on 
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, 12. 
 140. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 205–06, 209. 
 141. Id. at 209–210. 
 142. Id. 
 143. There is evidence that states worry most about losing their competitive edge when other 
states in their region or in their economic competition group are actively engaged in in signing BITs.  
Elkins et al., supra note 45, at 292, 298.  In addition, however, there is evidence that some nations sign 
BITs in order to qualify for international loans.  See id. at 295 (finding that states seeking assistance 
from the IMF are more likely to sign BITs). 
 144. MFN provisions can work to extend rights provided in one BIT to foreign investors from 
other nations as well.  Yet, states can negotiate BITs to only extend rights to a single state’s foreign 
investors, and, in any event, states need not provide the same rights to foreign and domestic investors. 
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limited to providing substantive legal rules, forums for dispute resolu-
tion, and choice-of-law principles for determining the governing law.  In 
foreign investment law, the law market shifts.  The state is not just a me-
diator of the obligations of private parties; here, it also binds itself to 
provide certain protections to investors, through contract, domestic law, 
and treaty.  Moreover, as a direct party to investment disputes, the state 
is highly unlikely to agree to bind itself to the governing law or courts of 
another sovereign state.  Thus, choice-of-law questions are unlikely to 
entail a pure choice between two states’ laws; the divergence does not 
eliminate choice-of-law questions, however.  Instead, the choice is one 
between the domestic law of the state, international law principles, or 
some combination thereof.   
International law can be implicated for at least two reasons.  First, 
BIT rights may not have an equivalent in domestic law.  For example, a 
BIT might affirmatively offer investors freedom from or compensation 
for regulatory expropriations even though no such protections exist in a 
signatory state’s domestic laws.  In such a circumstance, the content and 
scope of the protection, as well as applicable damages, might be deter-
mined according to international rather than domestic law. 
Second, in some investment documents, a state will bind itself to 
comply with international law or with decisions of a tribunal that would 
apply international law principles to define its duties.  For example, BITs 
commonly obligate the state to provide protections at a level provided in 
customary international law, and they make direct reference to common 
international law principles such as “national treatment” and “most-
favored nation” status.  With the insertion of international law, the state 
sometimes relinquishes its right to apply otherwise mandatory domestic 
laws without financial consequences.  Consider, for example, S.D. Meyers 
v. Canada,145 where the tribunal found that Canada’s ban on PCB exports 
violated NAFTA because it had an arbitrary and discriminatory impact 
on U.S. investors that generated about five million dollars in damages. 
For states, the choice of international law is typically part and parcel 
of the choice of forum.  When a state makes a commitment to abide by 
international law principles, that commitment is made effective through a 
corollary commitment to have disputes resolved outside national courts.  
Thus, it is common in BITs and in some investment contracts for the 
state to agree that disputes with investors will be resolved in internation-
al arbitration, through ICSID or otherwise.146  When the state chooses in-
ternational arbitration, the tribunal has access to publicly available deci-
sions of other tribunals that have dealt with investment disputes.  These 
mechanisms help to encourage a consistent development of international 
                                                                                                                                      
 145. Second Partial Award, (NAFTA/UNCITRAL 2002), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/ 
files/case-documents/ita0752.pdf.  
 146. Scholars have identified range of dispute resolution options in investment treaties. Allee & 
Peinhardt, supra note 28, at 2; Yackee, Credible Commitments, supra note 15, at 806.  
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law principles,147 although they are far from perfect in this regard.148  Of 
course, states can also agree to resolve disputes in arbitration using do-
mestic law principles.149  But the important point here is that the state 
loses its authority to interpret international law principles for purposes of 
determining its obligations in the BIT. 
As with the general law market, states differ in their positions on 
foreign investment law, with some states acting as active competitors, 
some as passive competitors, and others as noncompetitors.  Active com-
petitors will use the legal mechanisms—BITs, domestic law, and specific 
investment contracts—to take the lead in providing desirable legal pro-
tections to foreign investors.  South Korea is a good example of an active 
competitor for foreign investment, because it has signed a large number 
of strong BITs and has worked hard to put in place domestic law re-
forms.150  Passive competitors might not have a strong independent agen-
da to maximize foreign investments, but they will commit to use at least 
some of the legal mechanisms, where necessary, to ensure that they re-
tain some ability to attract, or at least retain, foreign investors.151  For 
noncompetitor states, other domestic concerns commonly swamp out any 
state interest in attracting foreign investors.  South Africa and Australia 
might reasonably be placed in this group.  South Africa has indicated a 
desire to not sign BITs unless it intends to export capital to the other 
country, and it has strong domestic pressures weighing against nondis-
criminatory treatment of investors.152  South Africa recently introduced 
legislation to: (1) eliminate access to international dispute resolution and 
                                                                                                                                      
 147. Joshua B. Simmons, Valuation in Investor-State Arbitrations: Toward A More Exact Science, 
30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 196, 205–08 (2012). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Donald Francis Donovan, The Relevance (Or Lack Thereof) of the Notion of “Mandatory 
Rules of Law” to Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 205, 209 (2007) (“In invest-
ment arbitration . . . the national law provided for in an investment contract would generally be the 
law of the host state, which naturally has the closest links to the transaction.”); Ama S. Bekoe, Com-
ment, The Illusory Choice: Examining the Illusion of “Choice” in Choice of Law Provisions–A Country 
Study Exploring One Aspect of Foreign Investment in the Caribbean, 42 HOW L.J. 505, 524 (1999) (not-
ing that national law can govern investment contracts). 
 150. South Korea has sixty-two bilateral investment treaties in force.  Bilateral Investment Treaties 
for the Reciprocal Protection of Investments, KOREA EXIMBANK,  http://koreaexim.go.kr/en/fdi/invest 
_02.jsbit.ly/1d6xliK (last visited July 14, 2014).  
 151. See Deborah L. Swenson, Why Do Developing Countries Sign BITs?, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 131, 155 (2005) (stating that a primary motivation for states entering BITs may be to retain 
previous investments). 
 152. Statement on the Cabinet meeting of 20 July 2010, REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. (JULY 20, 2010), 
available at http://www.gcis.gov.za/content/newsroom/media-releases/cabinet-statements/statement-
cabinet-meeting-held-20-july-2010; Dr. Rob Davies, Minister of Trade and Indus., Speech Delivered at 
UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development at University of Witwater-
strand (Jul. 26, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.gov.za/speeches/view.php?sid=29391&tid=7 
7861); Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, S. Afr.-Zim., Nov. 27, 
2009, http://dti.gov.za/parliament/040610_RSA_Zimbablowe_Agreement.pdf.  Statement on Cabinet 
meeting of 24 March 2010, REPUBLIC S. AFR.(Mar. 25, 2010) http://www.gcis.gov.za/content/news 
room/media-releases/cabinet-statements/statement-cabinet-meeting-held-24-march-2010; Peter Leon 
et al., South Africa Declines to Renew Bilateral Investment Treaties with European Union Member 
States, MONDAQ (Oct. 5, 2012), http://mondaq.com/x/195&6/international+trad+investment/South+ 
Africa+Declines+to+Renew+Bilateral+Investment+Treaties+With+European+Union+Member 
+States.   
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instead require dispute resolution to occur through South African courts 
or local ADR methods, and (2) make compensation for expropriation 
equivalent to the standards provided in the domestic constitution, which 
fail to grant investors full market value for expropriated investments.153   
While states vary in their relative appreciation of the value of trea-
ties, it is difficult to identify states that are always hostile to taking 
measures to protect foreign investors or their investors investing abroad.  
Almost all states have signed at least one BIT; even states that have only 
signed a handful of BITs, like Ireland,154 nevertheless work hard to be in-
vestment-friendly through domestic laws and institutions.  Although law 
market pressures here seem strong, states nevertheless differ markedly in 
both the number of BITs joined and the strength of the rights provided 
within them, as well as in the quality of rights provided in domestic legal 
rules and investment contracts. 
Regardless of their respective stance in the foreign investment law 
market, all states face a tradeoff when providing rights related to foreign 
investment.  Competing interest groups will pressure the state to provide 
lesser protections to foreign investment for various reasons.  First, some 
constituents might want states to retain unfettered regulatory authority, 
at least for some matters, rather than precommitting to elevate investor 
rights over those of other constituents.  Other constituents might push 
for domestic investors to be given the same rights and protections as for-
eign investors, which could have the effect of narrowing the set of rights 
granted to foreign investors.  Still other groups might fight to protect 
domestic competitors from foreign entry into their product and service 
markets. 
As with the general law market, lawyers likely play an active role in 
the development of investment law.  In investment planning, investment 
regulation, and conflict management, foreign investors will need local le-
gal services to support their commercial activities within a state.  That 
said, investment treaty arbitration itself does not seem to attract much 
local business.  Available empirical evidence indicates that multinational 
law firms generally dominate the representation of parties in investment 
treaty arbitration, whereas local firms appear to be relegated to provid-
                                                                                                                                      
 153. See Linda Ensor, Bill To Limit Arbitration for Foreign Investors, BDLIVE (Oct. 31, 2013, 5:52 
AM), http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/2013/10/31/bill-to-limit-arbitration-for-foreign-investors.  The 
restriction on dispute settlement and substantive rights may generate problems.  See id. (stating the 
draft bill is “likely to cause jitters among South Africa’s already skittish foreign investors”).  Similarly, 
although the new Abbott government may back-pedal from the earlier Gillard government, Australia 
has indicated its desire to eliminate investment rights related to dispute settlement.  AUST. GOV’T, 
DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, GILLARD GOVERNMENT TRADE POLICY STATEMENT: TRADING 
OUR WAY TO MORE JOBS AND PROSPERITY 14 (2011), available at http://www.acci.asn.au/get 
attachment/b9d3cfae-fc0c-4c2a-a3df-3f58228daf6d/Gillard-Government-Trade-Policy-Statement.aspx; 
Jürgen Kurtz, The Australia Trade Policy Statement on Investor-State Dispute Settlement,  ASIL 
INSIGHTS (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/22/australian-trade-policy-
statement-investor-state-dispute-settlement.  See also generally Jürgen Kurtz, Australia’s Rejection of 
Investor-State Arbitration: Causation, Omission and Implication, 27 ICSID REV. 65 (2012).  
 154. Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of 
Law, 19 MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 361–62 (2007) (discussing the relative lack of in-
vestment treaties in Ireland). 
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ing strategic local insights.155  It is not clear how much that matters, how-
ever, because the formalized disputes likely make up only a small frac-
tion of the legal business generated by foreign investment. 
2. Institutional Questions 
How can states best balance competing interests when making their 
decisions related to the legal regulation of international investments?  As 
conceived by O’Hara and Ribstein, the law market functions most effec-
tively when the state makes choice-of-law clause enforcement decisions 
through the legislature, rather than the judiciary.156  In the context of in-
ternational investment law, the institutional choice question is somewhat 
different, for at least three reasons.  First, states organize government 
decisions in different ways, with both monist and dualist governments 
making investment law, and thus broad generalizations about where 
choice-of-law decisions are best housed are difficult.  Second, in the con-
text of investment law, the adjudicative bodies very typically are not state 
entities, raising thorny delegation problems.  Third, some foreign inves-
tor rights are created by the state acting through its Executive, a factor 
not present in the classic law market paradigm. 
In the context of foreign investment, the choice-of-law question of-
ten takes the form of scope interpretation.  Specifically, irrespective of 
what body adjudicates the investment dispute, the governing law ques-
tion (domestic or international) typically turns on how broadly to inter-
pret BIT language, the location of the borders between BITs and invest-
ment contracts, and whether the BIT or the investment contract should 
control when the two conflict.  Some cases involving foreign investment 
may involve national courts adjudicating a host state’s domestic foreign 
investment law.  Yet, for investment contracts or treaty claims, which are 
arguably the lion’s share of formal disputes, nonstate adjudicative bodies 
must evaluate a host state’s legal obligations.  From a functional perspec-
tive, a tribunal attempting to locate the border between BITs and in-
vestment contracts should take into account how each of these docu-
ments is formed, and the derivative legal obligation. 
For democratic nations operating according to separation of powers 
principles, BITs will require ratification (and possibly ex ante delegations 
of acceptable terms) by the Legislature, whereas agents of the Executive 
branch likely negotiate investment contracts on the state’s behalf without 
formal legislative participation.  Even monist states—where domestic 
legislation implementing and ratifying a treaty is not required—have 
                                                                                                                                      
 155. See Franck, Myths and Realities, supra note 18 (identifying that the repeat players in the 
market for investment treaty arbitration counsel tended to be larger international firms but that local 
counsel are used strategically on an ad hoc basis to provide legal services). 
 156. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 12. 
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been known to seek outside support, through public referendum or oth-
erwise, as a prerequisite to signing onto investment treaties. 157   
With democratic mechanisms, BITs might have the advantage of re-
flecting broader interest group accountability and less capture than in-
vestment contracts, with less danger of corruption.  If so, then BITs ar-
guably arise in a better institutional environment where broader interest 
group participation might foster a more careful consideration of the 
tradeoffs between the net value of foreign investment and competing 
policy objectives.  Put differently, if a state’s goal is, or should be, to at-
tract foreign investment at the lowest possible cost to state sovereignty, 
then the legislature (or public referendum) may be the better institution 
to house those commitment decisions.  By contrast, decisions made by 
the Executive branch alone, especially in the context of nonpublic con-
tract negotiations, are less likely to fully incorporate competing constitu-
ent interests. 
On the other hand, investment contract negotiations by Executive 
agents can more quickly and effectively generate clear, finely-calibrated 
commitments.  Investment contracts enable greater clarity of obligation 
than BITs because they are specific to a particular investment and draft-
ed by a small, fixed group.  Moreover, investment contract terms are not 
incorporated into domestic law through the participation of a multimem-
ber legislative body.  When different legislators have differing views of 
the optimal strength of a nation’s commitment to foreign investors, then 
we can expect the resulting textual commitment to be more vague, in-
clude compromise language or other carveouts, and otherwise deprive 
investors of relative certainty regarding their rights and obligations.  
Contractual provisions are less likely to suffer such shortcomings. 
Additional factors better enable investment contracts to provide 
clearer and more finely-calibrated rights and obligations than BITs.  
BITs reflect the agreement of two states, which offer generalized and de-
rivative commitments to investors for the lifetime of the BIT. 158  The ne-
gotiating states presumably contemplate that the BIT will provide “one 
size fits all protection” in that it will cover a variety of foreign investors 
(whether individuals, small or large entities, or private or publicly held 
corporations), and protect a potentially diverse array of investment activ-
ities that could come to either state.  In that context, BIT language will 
necessarily be somewhat vague in order to effectively encompass the in-
terests of all potential investors irrespective of the size of the investor, 
the investor’s relative commercial leverage, the type of investment activi-
                                                                                                                                      
 157. Costa Rica is a case in point.  Although a monist state, see Alexis Mourre, Perspectives in 
International Arbitration in Latin America, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.  597, 601 (2006).  Costa Rica en-
gaged in a two-year public referendum process prior to the implementation of the Central American 
Free Trade Agreement.  Alberto R. Coll, Wielding Human Rights and Constitutional Procedure to 
Temper the Harms of Globalization: Costa Rica’s Battle Over the Central American Free Trade Agree-
ment, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L. L. 461, 461–63, 536–43 (2011). 
 158. Some but not all BITs have sunset provisions that permit them to continue for at least ten 
years with an option to renew.  Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 22, at 1530 n.31.  In virtually all 
cases, however, states signing BITs appear to contemplate long-term commitment. 
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ty involved, and the idiosyncrasies of the moment in time the investor in-
vests.  By contrast, the investment contract covers one state and one in-
vestor, at a specific time, contemplating a specific type of investment ac-
tivity.  This more particularized negotiating environment better enables a 
clearer and more careful articulation of the extent to which the state pre-
commits itself, in terms of protections, dispute resolution process, and 
choice of governing law. 159  States provide these commitments in a docu-
ment that describes the investor’s own obligations, which are given in re-
turn for a state’s express undertakings. 
Thus, relative to BITs, specific investment contracts carry the po-
tential for the state to economize on its sovereignty costs, both with less 
generous promises and by constraining the discretion granted to external 
tribunals to determine the scope of its commitments.  At the same time, 
the contracts can provide investors with a better sense of their invest-
ment risks.  More importantly, clear commitments can save both parties 
dispute resolution costs down the road and generate enhanced ex ante 
certainty. 
Given the tradeoffs between legislative and executive decision mak-
ing, foreign investment decisions made by dualist governments presuma-
bly should involve some combination of the two institutions.  To some 
degree, states do blend institutional participation.  Perhaps the best insti-
tutional implementation would be for the state to negotiate the general 
parameters of its obligations in BITs and to provide more specific protec-
tions in investment contracts under the proviso that the Executive’s au-
thority to negotiate contract terms is constrained by the Legislature.  
Under this institutional structure, states can make valuable reputational 
commitments to protecting foreign investments in their BITs, but they 
can carefully calibrate their commitments in individual investment con-
tracts.  Legislative constraints on contract terms could work to temper 
the problems associated with capture, silent interests, and potential cor-
ruption.  Constraints could take many possible forms, including both 
procedural constraints (i.e., requiring notice and comment periods be-
tween the drafting and the ultimate signing of investment contracts) and 
substantive restrictions (i.e., prohibitions on investment contract terms 
that compromise the state’s ability to protect air and water quality).  Leg-
islative constraints would make it more likely that competing domestic 
interests are reflected in the contracts.  Although nothing guarantees that 
a state will make wise decisions, this institutional structure better enables 
the state to encourage investment at lowest possible cost to domestic in-
terests, as opposed to other alternatives.160  When the institutional struc-
                                                                                                                                      
 159. Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties, supra note 70, at 452–53. 
 160. From this perspective, it becomes clear why it would not make sense for a state to abandon 
BITs in favor of only using investment contracts.  Yackee, Toward a Return, supra note 67, at 137 
(suggesting that states should consider taking this course).  BITs obligate a state to undertake general 
commitments, often through the cooperation of the Executive and Legislative branches of govern-
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eign investor rights.  Investors who are comfortable proceeding with these rather vague rights can in-
vest in the state without negotiating a specific contract with the state.  Contracts negotiated with the 
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ture forces careful consideration of the tradeoffs up front, states will be 
less likely to retreat from their commitments on the back end. 161 
C. Implications of a Law Market Analysis for Foreign Investment Law 
Questions 
As previous Sections have described, BITs and investment contracts 
are two commitment devices states use to attract foreign investment.  
Each of these mechanisms has strengths and weaknesses, and the two 
serve interrelated roles that carry the promise of working together to 
produce more effective incentives than either could achieve alone.  As a 
functional matter, we advocate that these instruments be interpreted in 
ways that take into account their strengths, limitations, and interrelated 
roles.  As part of that functional analysis, interpretation doctrine should 
reflect the comparative institutional and drafting advantages of these 
documents. 
As mentioned above, BITs are often negotiated and ratified with 
the cooperation of a state’s legislative branch; in general, legislatures are 
better able to take into account competing constituent interests than is 
the executive acting alone. 
In contrast, investment contracts are negotiated and signed by exec-
utives and might not be subject to public debate.  Despite this weakness, 
investment contracts provide a valuable environment for states to fine-
tune their commitments to international investments.  In order to har-
ness this advantage of investment contracts while tempering their poten-
tial costs, states can create legislative checks on the contract terms or 
procedures by which such contracts are executed.  Where such checks are 
possible, the investment contracts are more likely to enable the state to 
more carefully calibrate the rights of the investor based on the particular 
investment, its benefit to the country, the degree to which protections are 
necessary in order to induce a particular investment, and the reciprocal 
responsibilities of the investor in connection with its investment. 
From a functional perspective, careful calibration of the state’s 
commitments is important.  Recall the most basic tradeoff facing all 
states: to compete as effectively as desired for foreign investment at the 
lowest possible cost to other policy goals.  States will vary in the extent to 
which they are prepared to tie their hands behind their backs, because 
they differ with respect to (1) the extent to which they desire foreign in-
vestment and the types of investment they seek to attract, (2) the degree 
of reputation deficit that must be made up in order to attract that in-
vestment, and (3) the importance to the state (given constituent interest 
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 161. This solution may not be an option for monist states, unless opportunities for legislative 
and/or populist interventions arise as a matter of political economy in response to news of the terms of 
investment contracts. 
  
1650 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2014 
groups) of attaining competing policy goals.  In general, our functional 
approach calls for treating international investment questions in ways 
that maximize state abilities to fine-tune their commitments while design-
ing legal rules with an eye toward facilitating states’ abilities to house 
their commitment decisions in the government institution that is best sit-
uated to ensure sound decision making.  Under such circumstances, the 
law market for foreign investment can function at its best. 
This Section will explore the implications of our analysis for the 
treatment of some issues that have arisen recently in investment disputes.  
Subsection 1 will consider the implications of this analysis for the inter-
pretation of BIT umbrella clauses.  Subsection 2 will consider whether 
states should be permitted to contract out of umbrella clauses and pro-
vide a mechanism for enabling such opt outs in investment contracts.  
Subsection 3 briefly discusses other contractual mechanisms that states 
can use to temper the costs of delegating BIT interpretation and en-
forcement to nonstate adjudicators.  Finally, Subsection 4 provides some 
preliminary thoughts on the implications of our analysis for tribunal in-
terpretations of MFN provisions. 
1. Umbrella Clauses 
When BITs include provisions declaring that each state agrees to 
comply with its commitments, including contractual obligations, such 
language carries the potential to convert a state’s ordinary breach of con-
tract into a treaty violation.  As mentioned earlier, investment treaty tri-
bunals have struggled with the question of whether umbrella clauses give 
the tribunal jurisdiction to hear breach of contract claims, and, if so, 
whether national or international law applies to resolve such claims.  
States should be empowered to use a BIT to confer such authority on the 
tribunal because such promises can enable the state to commit to provid-
ing a favorable forum to investors for their contract disputes and a single 
forum for resolution of all disputes.  Tribunal decisions interpreting BITs 
as denying such jurisdiction can unjustifiably limit the state’s ability to 
use the BIT to provide maximal protections, an important tool for juris-
dictional competition. 
Of course, the question of whether an umbrella clause elevates 
breach of contract claims against the state to treaty violations turns on 
usual tools for interpretation, including the specific language and place-
ment of the umbrella clause.  There is fundamental disagreement be-
tween arbitral tribunals regarding the proper interpretation of an um-
brella clause when the BIT language leaves the matter uncertain.  
Recently, several tribunals have interpreted the clauses narrowly, con-
cluding that the state should provide clear evidence that it wishes to ele-
vate basic breach of contract claims to treaty violations.162  For example, 
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in SGS v. Pakistan,163 SGS, a Swiss company, asked an ICSID tribunal to 
take jurisdiction over its dispute with the Pakistani government resulting 
from Pakistan’s termination of their contract for preshipment inspection 
services.164  Under the terms of the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT, both states 
were obligated to observe all commitments entered into with investors 
from the other state.165  The tribunal declined to take jurisdiction over the 
dispute, stating that because exercising such jurisdiction could have far-
reaching impact on the sovereignty of the signing states, a clearer state-
ment of such intent would be needed.166   
This general interpretive approach, to read the umbrella clause nar-
rowly, has been followed by other tribunals which have concluded that 
umbrella clauses can cover contracts where the state acts as sovereign, 
but not mere commercial contracts.167  Some tribunals have also used a 
similar interpretive approach in concluding that breach of contract claims 
are covered under the BIT umbrella clause only when the breach of con-
tract constitutes a significant interference with the investor’s rights.168   
Other tribunals have afforded wider scope to the umbrella clauses.  
Some have interpreted the umbrella clauses to confer treaty jurisdiction 
over breach of contract claims. 169  Still others have determined that the 
umbrella clause even works to undo a forum-selection clause in the in-
vestment contract.170 
From a common sense perspective, it is hard to see what purpose 
some umbrella clauses serve in BITs if not to further commit a state to 
comply with its contractual promises or other undertakings.171  That fur-
ther commitment presumably becomes meaningful because it determines 
the governing choice of forum and choice of law for resolution of the 
breach of contract claim.  Put differently, without an advance choice of 
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 171. See, e.g., Eli Lauterpacht, The Drafting of Treaties for the Protection of Investment, in THE 
ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 18, 31 (1962); An-
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law or choice of forum, a foreign investor must typically bring its breach 
of contract claims in a state court with jurisdiction.  This likely means 
that foreign investors would bring investment disputes against the state 
in the host state’s courts where, using the state’s conflicts-of-law princi-
ples, the state would resolve the dispute under its national law.  If state 
law is weak and/or the courts are biased, then investor rights can only be 
protected by enabling the investor to opt out of local law and courts.  
Umbrella clauses can give foreign investors such rights. 
Of course, it is possible that states place umbrella clause language 
into a BIT without intending the language to be doing any work at all, 
except to express a general expectation that each state will comply with 
its preexisting international law and other legal obligations.  From that 
perspective, the BIT should not work to confer jurisdiction on the tribu-
nal to resolve breach of contract claims.  This latter view is arguably in-
consistent with canons of treaty interpretation, including using a treaty’s 
“plain meaning” to prevent provisions from being construed as mere 
surplusage,172 but it remains a plausible explanation of state drafting be-
havior. 
Notwithstanding this latter possibility and the restrictive stance of 
some tribunals, we think that BITs should be interpreted to confer juris-
diction on investment treaty tribunals to hear the contract claims.  This 
default rule places a thumb on the scale in favor of the law market for 
foreign investment law because it fosters state efforts to provide broader 
investor protections, while also fostering the state’s ability to fine-tune its 
obligations through investment contract provisions.  Because the inter-
pretive approach would function as a default rule, states not intending to 
confer such jurisdiction can avoid elevating contract claims by expressly 
controlling jurisdiction in their BITs.173  This interpretive rule would op-
erate to construe the umbrella clause in favor of the investor and against 
the state, which makes sense given that the state authors both the BIT 
and the investment contract, and is therefore in the best position to rec-
oncile the two.  Importantly, this broader BIT interpretation might force 
a political conversation involving the legislature at the point in time that 
the BIT is ratified.  If so, interest groups opposed to this ceding of sover-
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eign authority will have the opportunity to pressure the state to narrow 
or eliminate the BIT umbrella clause. 
Regardless of the outcome, our proposed rule of interpretation 
would encourage competing interest group participation in the determi-
nation of whether the state should further cede its authority to external 
tribunals in order to attempt to attract more foreign investment.  When 
tribunals read the umbrella clauses narrowly, these questions are avoid-
ed, and it becomes more difficult for states to use BITs to make strong 
commitments in favor of investor protections. 
Note also that if the umbrella clause expands investor rights, then it 
must be the case that the BIT includes both an umbrella clause and a 
strong dispute resolution provision (or, at least stronger than whatever 
else might be provided to the investors).  If the dispute resolution provi-
sion is strong (strong enough so that the investor seeks to rely on it), then 
the state has signaled a willingness to undertake a strong precommitment 
to the protection of investor rights.  It therefore seems reasonable to in-
terpret the umbrella provision broadly, in the manner most consistent 
with this strong precommitment. 
2. Contracts Can Trump Umbrella Clause 
Although we advocate interpreting umbrella clauses to include 
breach of contract claims unless clearly excluded, we also think states 
should retain the ability to minimize or particularize umbrella clause pro-
tections in individual investment contracts.  Put differently, states might 
wish to further calibrate investment incentives by either limiting or ex-
panding the jurisdiction of investment treaty tribunals to resolve contract 
claims, and by altering the choice of law (national or international law) 
used to resolve those claims.  Broad tribunal interpretations may surprise 
states and impede state sovereign authority, and not all investors will re-
quire such drastic measures as a precondition for investing.  Individually 
negotiated investment contracts can act as a valuable corrective mecha-
nism for fine-tuning investment incentives in light of the specific circum-
stances of an investment at a unique moment in time. 
The challenge for a state is to use investment contracts to fine-tune, 
while constraining the Executive from making poor contract decisions. 
Recall that executive decision making is less likely to internalize nonin-
vestment interests than legislative determination; however, dualist states 
can mitigate that limitation by empowering the legislature to place limits 
on permissible investment contract terms.  Under our proposed interpre-
tation of umbrella clauses, BITs containing umbrella clauses will be in-
terpreted to elevate contract claims.  Given this powerful investor right, 
in most cases the Executive would consider providing investors with less-
er protections in the contract than they receive in the BIT.  Executives 
might be insufficiently motivated to insist on such protections, but pre-
sumably when they do, the concern that the Executive will fail to consid-
er noninvestment interests is inapt because those interests will be reflect-
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ed in the contract.  In any event, legislative devices could encourage bet-
ter executive decisions.  For example, a legislature could encourage more 
careful deliberations by insisting that the Executive provide written justi-
fications for its dispute resolution clauses.  The legislature might also 
prohibit the Executive from expanding tribunal jurisdiction by contract if 
such expansion would be deemed excessive. 
Investors can hardly complain that they were unfairly surprised by 
the fact that their umbrella clause protections were minimized, because 
those protections would be available except when an investment contract 
clearly takes them away.  If the contract takes them away, then investors 
are given notice about the narrowed scope of conferred rights. Moreover, 
if an investor enters into a contract with the state, then it must derive 
some benefit in the contract that would not otherwise be provided by 
governing law, including the relevant BIT, and the contract must provide 
benefits sufficiently large enough to induce the investor to cede its um-
brella clause protections.  Finally, any investor who feels disgruntled by a 
strong-armed denial of umbrella clause protections could make its con-
tract public, which could serve to undermine any reputational benefit 
that the state enjoyed from incorporating umbrella clauses into the rele-
vant BIT in the first place. 
Note also that providing the state with the authority to contract 
around umbrella clause protections would enable the state to fix, or at 
least mitigate, potential treaty interpretation problems.  If umbrella 
clauses were interpreted to confer jurisdiction on the tribunal to resolve 
breach of contract disputes, states might experience difficulty amending 
BITs drafted before such a treaty interpretation rule was put in place.174  
Even though such an interpretation could threaten to commit a state to 
more than it originally intended, the state could limit the reach of the in-
terpretation rule by narrowing its contractual commitments, where pos-
sible. 
Despite the appeal of this solution from a functional perspective, it 
might seem heretical to international law scholars.  First, for those who 
think about hierarchies of law in a formalist manner, surely treaties are 
superior to contracts, and that fact implies that a contract should never 
work to shrink a state’s treaty obligations.175  Furthermore, some scholars 
focus on the fact that states only are parties to BITs, with investors at 
best serving as third-party beneficiaries.176  By so casting the investor, at 
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least one scholar has concluded that investors cannot ex ante abrogate 
the rights bargained by the home state.177  In the words of one author, “it 
would be paradoxical for a host state to require that investors waive the 
dispute settlement protections of the very treaty that their home state 
negotiated for their protection.”178 
Finally, as a formal matter, BITs impose reciprocal obligations on 
the signatory states.  The states might in fact occupy very different posi-
tions, with a “host” state primarily seeking to attract investment and a 
“home” state primarily seeking to provide positive investment opportu-
nities for its businesses.  Nevertheless, BIT language obligates both states 
to provide investors from the other nation with the same rights, and 
sometimes the economic trajectories of the two states results in a turning 
of the tables, where the home state later finds itself to be a host state ob-
ligated to comply with the very limits it insisted on when the treaty was 
drafted.179  If the umbrella clause is viewed as a provision binding both 
states to the treaty, then enabling a state to unilaterally water down its 
obligations through contract seems problematically nonmutual. 
One way to confer discretion on the state to contract around um-
brella clause protections while addressing these concerns is to enable the 
states to insert express reservations in the BIT related to the umbrella 
clause.  The reservation could provide that one (or both) of the states to 
the treaty reserves a right to modify investors’ rights regarding breach of 
contract claims in investment contracts.180  Excessive reliance on the res-
ervation could become a diplomatic issue, but it should not rise to the 
level of an ultra vires treaty violation. 
Such reservations could actually promote a race to the top for 
states.  Contractual flexibility can benefit both states and investors.  First, 
contractual flexibility makes it easier for a tribunal to conclude that it has 
jurisdiction over contract claims by virtue of the umbrella clause, because 
states can mitigate the potential costs of such a conclusion.  Second, con-
tractual flexibility promotes certainty regarding the parties’ rights and 
responsibilities, which can enable better planning and significantly re-
duce dispute resolution costs.  And, given that the state is made up of 
domestic interest groups, some of whom might stand to lose from an un-
duly expansive view of investor rights, enhanced contract flexibility ena-
bles the state to adopt a better balance of interests.  Overall, a more fine-
tuned experimentation makes it easier for states to observe the set of 
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provisions that work best, given its competing needs.  In the end, state 
responses to perceived excesses are more likely to remain within the in-
vestment treaty framework, with the result that international trade and 
investment could be more effectively preserved.181 
Under our proposed approach, then, states’ umbrella clauses can 
take one of three forms: (1) a simple umbrella clause, which has the ef-
fect of conferring jurisdiction on the investment treaty tribunal to resolve 
contract disputes; (2) umbrella clauses that clearly articulate that no such 
jurisdiction is to be conferred; and (3) umbrella clauses that confer juris-
diction but with the caveat that the jurisdiction can be limited, eliminat-
ed, or expanded in investment contracts. 
3. Other Contractual Mechanisms 
Recently states have expressed dissatisfaction with ICSID arbitra-
tion as being unfairly one-sided and as expanding states’ treaty obliga-
tions beyond what they contemplated, thus unreasonably hampering 
states’ abilities to respond to domestic needs.182  While the one-sided na-
ture of arbitration outcomes is not substantiated in empirical studies,183 
states nevertheless express concern, and a few have signaled a movement 
away from ICSID arbitration, particular BIT provisions, or both.184 
Note that investment contract provisions could be used in many 
ways to mitigate the perceived cost of the treaties, as used and interpret-
ed, without actually conflicting with BIT obligations.  Our analysis sug-
gests that states should actively consider such fine-tuning devices.  We 
consider just one possibility here: a contract provision that adopts a one-
way fee shifting rule.  Attorney, arbitrator, and expert fees and other 
costs represent a substantial portion of the average investment arbitra-
tion award—in some instances, an average of sixty percent of the average 
award; meanwhile, small states complain that the threat of arbitration 
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alone creates problems for them.185  A state experiencing these difficul-
ties could attempt to renegotiate BIT substantive provisions, dispute res-
olution provisions, or both, to address the problem.  Often such renego-
tiations are not possible, and in any event, they might prove to be more 
drastic steps than are necessary to mitigate the state’s cost concerns. 
An alternative solution could be investment contract provisions that 
provide that if the investor loses, then it must pay the state’s legal fees, 
but if the state loses, the investor must still pay its own costs.  This solu-
tion could mitigate the costs of unmeritorious lawsuits, thereby removing 
investors’ ability to influence domestic policies with litigation threats, 
while at the same time still holding states to their foreign investment 
commitments.  Moreover, this solution does not require one to buy into a 
regime where contracts can reduce BIT obligations, because it does not 
appear that any currently existing BIT treaty provisions would prevent a 
one-way fee shifting clause. 186  Such a contract provision might not pro-
vide a workable solution for all states or all investors, but the point here 
is that the contracts can serve an underappreciated fine-tuning role. 
Some states find themselves in need of resurrecting their reputa-
tions as a result of poor past investor treatment, and these states might 
wish to provide even greater investor protection in their contracts than 
what is provided in its prior BITs.  Here, too, contractual language can 
be used to enhance investor protections. As mentioned earlier, in appro-
priate circumstances, legislatures in dualist governments might wish to 
pass legislation constraining contractual provisions.  Overall, however, 
the contracts can play an important supporting role with BITs, even 
without BIT reservation clauses. 
Finally, if investment contracts can narrow rights provided in a BIT, 
with or without a reservation clause, then the contractual solution can 
become a method for disgruntled states to experiment with narrowing 
BIT provisions before attempting broad-scale treaty renegotiations.  Af-
ter all, BIT modifications can have potentially large or unintended con-
sequences that could have the effect of chilling them despite complaint.  
Overly specific definitions or overly broad tribunal constraints could cre-
ate absurd results or unduly hamper an arbitral tribunal’s ability to ren-
der flexible and/or equitable decisions, and some restrictive moves could 
negatively affect foreign investments.  Experimentation with narrowing 
investor rights and/or tribunal discretion through contract thus offers a 
unique opportunity to create feedback mechanisms that offer valuable 
information to both investors and states. 
States might wish to experiment with a variety of contractual provi-
sions.  For states concerned that BITs unduly limit their regulatory au-
thority, contracts could make clear that the state retains discretion over 
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particular matters, such as environmental protection or tax policy.  States 
might want to limit the forum where investors can bring contractual dis-
putes.  On a smaller scale, states worried about significant damages 
awards could mandate that arbitrators engage in a limited form of dam-
age calculations or exclude the possibility that investors make claims for 
moral damages.  Meanwhile, those concerned about the costs of arbitra-
tion could introduce mediation as a prerequisite to the investor filing a 
demand for arbitration. 
4. Most Favored Nation Provisions—Preliminary Thoughts 
Recently, investment treaty tribunals have addressed the appropri-
ate scope of MFN clauses, which are commonly found in BITs.  In the in-
vestment treaty context, MFNs help an active competitor to precommit 
to offering state-of-the-art investor protections.  MFNs can also help pas-
sive competitors who provide minimal necessary protections, because a 
later determination that a protection is necessary to protect foreign in-
vestment will apply backward to fix holes in prior BITs. 
That said, however, in the BIT context, MFNs have potentially 
broad-sweeping implications for a state’s ability to fine-tune investment 
incentives.  Presumably the terms in a BIT have much to do with the 
benefits the signatory states believe that they can garner from foreign in-
vestment, and that potential benefit can vary depending on the magni-
tude and types of investment that might come from the counterparty 
state.  In addition, states’ need to bolster their reputations for protecting 
investments can vary over time.  For these and other reasons, a state 
might well wish to meaningfully vary the investment rights and dispute 
resolution options in different treaties.  MFN provisions can substantially 
hinder this differentiation.  In fact, they could work to significantly limit 
the rights granted in an individual BIT. 
MFN clauses position states as active competitors because they rep-
resent a commitment to likely future expansion of investor rights.  But 
for passive competitors, who do not want to lose foreign investment op-
portunities but also wish to minimize ceding more investor rights than 
absolutely necessary, MFNs can prove problematic.187  MFN’s operate to 
create substantive rights in previously negotiated BITs, and if those 
rights were not considered necessary to that BIT when originally negoti-
ated, conferring them ex post might force the state to incur unnecessary 
sovereignty costs. 
In addition, MFNs can work to expand rights in wholly unanticipat-
ed ways.  In particular, tribunals have recently struggled with the ques-
tion of whether the MFN can also work to expand the BIT dispute reso-
lution clauses.  Whereas the rights tend to be vague and often signal 
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more general commitments, tribunals constituted ex post must adjudicate 
claims to give a particularized meaning to investment commitments.  
Given the outsourcing of the interpretive function, the choice of venue 
for dispute resolution can be a critically important determinant of the 
shape of the state’s commitments.  In other words, without knowing in 
advance what specific content will be given to the general rights provi-
sions, the state’s legal fate often turns on the choice of venue for dispute 
resolution.  When that choice, provided in one BIT, is expanded to oth-
ers, it can have across-the-board repercussions for the state that are im-
possible to fully forecast.  Although it is not clear that one dispute resolu-
tion forum (let alone differences among arbitration forums) is 
systematically more or less biased than another,188 states might neverthe-
less find this potential lack of control troublesome. 
The risk of unintended expansion of investor rights over time fuels 
the current dissatisfaction of some states with their BIT regimes.  In addi-
tion to withdrawing from the ICSID Convention, some states have an-
nounced an unwillingness to sign new BITs.  South Africa has indicated 
its refusal to sign new BITs and has let prior BITs expire or otherwise 
given notice to terminate its BITs.189  The Czech Republic has explored 
canceling its BIT with the United States,190 and Ecuador and Venezuela 
have provided notice that they also are cancelling their BITs.191  Rather 
than walking away from BITs or ICSID arbitration, unhappy states could 
think about narrowing their substantive rights provisions.  For those 
states, the MFN clause might well be a good place to start. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Larry Ribstein’s scholarship contains multiple insights, and we at-
tempt to honor his memory here by extending his work on jurisdictional 
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competition to the market for the law of foreign investment.  Not only is 
foreign investment law driven by state efforts to attract foreign assets—
fueling the supply side of the law market—but these laws enhance asset 
mobility more generally, which works to motivate states to provide at-
tractive commercial laws more generally. 
Instead of casting jurisdictional competition as a normative good 
(justifying expansive investor rights) or as a normative bad (justifying 
state retreat from its investment commitments), we adopt Larry’s more 
positive stance toward jurisdictional competition.  Specifically, jurisdic-
tional competition for international investment simply is; the competition 
exists because exit-affected interest groups within a state recognize that 
they will benefit if the state successfully attracts assets, business activities, 
know-how, and revenues from abroad.  Jurisdictional competition for 
foreign investment stokes controversy, however, because competing 
groups’ interests are hindered when the state cedes its sovereign authori-
ty in an attempt to attract the investments.  There is no objective way to 
know the ex ante optimal balance between these competing interests for 
all situations, but presumably the foreign investment law decisions of in-
dividual states can be enhanced if those decisions are housed within the 
state to encourage the broadest possible interest group participation.  In 
addition, enhanced interest group participation can help bolster the legit-
imacy of the states’ decisions. 
In this Article, we focused on the fact that states make commit-
ments to investors in both BITs and investment contracts, and the two 
devices carry differing strengths and limitations.  BITs are vaguely-
worded, publicly accessible documents providing investment rights to all 
investors from another nation, and in dualist countries both legislatures 
and executives play a role in BIT ratification.  Investment contracts are 
privately negotiated agreements that the state, through its Executive, en-
ters into with individual investors.  Relative to BITs, investment con-
tracts can be more specifically worded, and they can more effectively be 
used to fine-tune investment incentives.  On the other hand, the contracts 
are subject to investor capture and even the possibility of corruption, and 
they likely are less effective as reputation-enhancing devices. 
We argue that investment commitments should use the strengths of 
both of these documents while mitigating their limitations.  General 
commitments can be stated in BITs, with more fine-tuned commitments 
provided in investment contracts.  To facilitate the market for investment 
law, while encouraging competing interest group participation and clear-
er BIT statements, we advocate that BIT umbrella clauses be interpreted 
to elevate contract disputes to treaty disputes, giving the treaty tribunal 
jurisdiction over them, unless the BIT provides otherwise. 
In addition, we argue that international investment law principles 
incorporate the notion that investment contracts can narrow a state’s 
BIT obligations, at least for purposes of resolving investor-state disputes.  
By empowering the state’s ability to fine-tune investment incentives in 
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contracts, the state can more effectively economize on sovereignty costs 
while still encouraging international investment.  This latter principle 
could be Pareto-improving because investors who find their rights nar-
rowed in the contract presumably get some offsetting benefit from enter-
ing the contract in the first place.  In dualist countries, the legislature can 
impose procedural or substantive limitations on executive contract nego-
tiations in order to either make public the contracts and/or to limit exec-
utive authority to interfere with important competing domestic interests.  
We also argue that, more generally, states should consider using invest-
ment contract terms to help mitigate the perceived costs of BITs, rather 
than rejecting BITs or ICSID arbitration altogether. 
Finally, we raise the question of whether MFNs serve the interests 
of states that do not wish to be active competitors in the investment law 
market.  The ubiquity of MFN and other strong BIT provisions could be 
evidence that states are active competitors regardless of the marginal 
costs to state sovereignty.  Where domestic interests are strong enough to 
focus a state on economizing on the sovereignty costs of attracting in-
vestment, however, MFNs can prove counterproductive to both the 
state’s interests and their willingness to experiment with broader investor 
protections in the future. 
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